Accommodation of religious and cultural differences in medical school training by Hayton, Susan
	  	  	  	  	  	  
Accommodation of Religious and Cultural Differences  
in Medical School Training 	  	  
 
A Thesis Submitted to the College of 
Graduate Studies and Research 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
For the Degree of Master of Laws 
In the College of Law 
University of Saskatchewan 
Saskatoon 
 
 
 
 
By: 
Susan L. Hayton 
 
 
© Copyright Susan L. Hayton, January 2014. All rights reserved. 
	  	   i	  
 
     Permission to Use 
 
In presenting this thesis in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the LL.M. degree 
from the University of Saskatchewan, College of Law, I agree that the libraries of this 
University may make it freely available for inspection. I further agree that permission for 
copying of this thesis in any manner, in whole or in part, for scholarly purposes may be 
granted by the professor or professors who supervised my thesis work or, in their 
absence, by the Dean of the College Law. It is understood that any copy or publication or 
use of this thesis or parts thereof for financial gain shall not be allowed without my 
written permission. It is also understood that due recognition shall be given to me and to 
the University of Saskatchewan in any use which may be made of any material in my 
thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	   ii	  
Abstract	  	  
As with many other disciplines, the study of medicine is being influenced by the change 
in the cultural make-up of our country.  On occasion, conflicts may develop between the 
personal beliefs of medical students and the training they must undertake in order to 
become competent and caring physicians. What are the implications for medical school 
training in terms of the increasing diversity of the individuals applying to, and being 
accepted into, medical schools across this country?  How much should we allow the 
personal beliefs and values of physicians-in-training to modify the medical education 
experience as it currently exists?  Do we need to accommodate these individual student 
differences (religious and cultural) when designing and modifying the medical school 
curriculum? 
This thesis looks at the requirement for accommodation (as established in human rights 
legislation) and the rights of individuals entering into medical school training (as 
guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms) and attempts to balance 
these individual rights against the goal of a medical school to develop a generic physician 
who is prepared, at completion of medical school training, to enter into many different 
post-graduate training programs.  Medical school training involves a number of different 
types of learning including: knowledge acquisition, procedural competence, and the 
ability to interact in an intimate, yet wholly professional, manner with complete 
strangers.  Current accreditation requirements demand that each medical student achieves 
a requisite level of knowledge, and the ability to perform certain physical examinations 
and associated procedures, by the completion of medical school training.  
Three distinct examples of possible requests for accommodation are examined during this 
thesis in order to determine if, and when, accommodation is reasonable and achievable.  
Although it is possible to allow some degree of modification of the medical school 
training process in order to accommodate religious or cultural beliefs of particular 
students, this accommodation is currently not possible if bona fide educational 
requirements are undermined during this accommodation or if accommodation of 
students would require undue hardship on the part of the particular medical school, staff 
or other students involved in the training process.   
Creating a standard process whereby students can request a modification of their 
involvement in the medical school curriculum (in order to accommodate religious or 
cultural differences) will facilitate unbiased and reasonable decision-making.  This will 
allow students and faculty to have reasonable expectations about the ability of each 
individual to be successfully integrated into the medical school training program.  It 
would also be useful and responsible to make it clear to students applying to be admitted 
to medical school where the limits are with respect to what degree of modification of 
medical school training is possible.  The knowledge and clinical abilities that a student 
will be expected to master, within a Canadian medical school curriculum, must be 
consistent with the expectation of non-discrimination, as identified by provincial and 
national human rights legislation, and with the rights and freedoms as guaranteed by the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Canada is a multicultural society that has been quite successful at integrating 
people of different cultural and religious backgrounds into its societal fabric.  As 
Canadians, we are encouraged to respect the differences of others and to accept that there 
are cultural and religious beliefs of other Canadians that should be treated with respect 
and tolerance, even if these beliefs are significantly different from our own.  Despite this 
historical acceptance and integration of immigrants, there has been increasing discussion, 
over the past number of years, about reasonable accommodation of religious and cultural 
beliefs within Canada, particularly within Quebec.  In addition, there has been increasing 
awareness of the fact that one significant component of our population, our Aboriginal 
membership, has not received the acceptance and respect for cultural differences that we 
might have hoped.  
Over the past half century, people have become more and more mobile and 
immigration to Canada has increased with our rising world population.  We are seeing a 
greater diversity in our population in Canada compared to 50 years ago when most of our 
immigrant population originated from Europe.  Today, most Canadian immigrants are 
from Asia.1  This increasing ethnic diversity has introduced greater numbers of 
individuals with different cultural and religious beliefs into our population. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 1Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon, “Assessing the Impact of Recent Immigration Trends on Canadian Foreign 
Policy” in David Carment & David Bercuson, eds., The World in Canada: Diaspora, 
Demography, and Domestic Politics (McGill: Queen's University Press, 2008) at 31. 
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In recent years, there has been increased discussion and anxiety within other 
democratic nations, particularly European nations, about the challenges raised by 
immigration.  Anxiety with respect to immigration has also become evident in Quebec 
society, most significantly over the past ten years.  The resulting discourse led to 
formation of the Consultation Commission on Accommodation Practices Related to 
Cultural Differences (Bouchard-Taylor Report)2 in 2007 with a mandate to look at the 
reality and perceptions of immigration in Quebec and to make recommendations 
regarding the best approach to take when attempting to integrate new immigrants into 
Quebec society.  Although these suggestions were directed primarily at Quebec society, 
the concept of reasonable accommodation, supported by modern democratic viewpoints, 
and constitutional underpinnings such as the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms3, 
allow many of these suggestions to be translated to the rest of Canada in terms of 
providing a framework on which policy positions can be built.  
 Discussion about reasonable accommodation in Canada has been spurred on by 
recent concerns in Quebec, and a number of European nations, but it has equal relevance 
to challenges associated with ongoing alterations within Canadian society, within 
immigrant and non-immigrant populations, and within the Aboriginal population in 
Canada.   
Clashes between laws of general application and minority religious practices are 
likely to escalate in the future as a result of broad factors such as the growth of the 
administrative state, the development of technologies that may aid the state in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Gérard Bouchard and Charles Taylor,  BUILDING THE FUTURE, A Time for Reconciliation, online: 
http://www.accommodements.qc.ca/documentation/rapports/rapport-final-integral-en.pdf. 
 
3 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 
[Charter]. 
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addressing security concerns, the rise of immigration from communities with 
different conceptions of the significance of seemingly neutral requirements, and 
the greater secularization of Canadian society as a whole.4 
 
How do we respectfully support the right for groups and individuals to practice their 
religious and cultural beliefs, but continue to educate varying professionals in a manner 
consistent with Canadian values and constitutional requirements?  
As with many other disciplines, the study of medicine is being influenced by the 
change in the cultural make-up of our country.  On occasion, conflicts may develop 
between the personal beliefs of medical students and the training they must undertake in 
order to become competent and caring physicians. What are the implications for medical 
school training in terms of the increasing diversity of the individuals applying to, and 
being accepted into, medical schools across this country?  How much should we allow 
the personal beliefs and values of physicians-in-training to modify the medical education 
experience as it currently exists?  Do we need to accommodate these individual student 
differences (religious and cultural) when designing and modifying the medical school 
curriculum?  Do we need to accept conscientious objection by medical students with 
respect to involvement in certain types of medical teaching sessions, contact with patients 
and performance or observation of particular medical procedures?  If we are open to 
adjustment of the medical curriculum in these ways, then when should these 
accommodations occur and how do we make the decision to allow for these 
modifications?  How might accommodation change the finished product (physician, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Sara Weinrib, “An Exemption for Sincere Believers:  The Challenge of Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of 
Wilson Colony” (2011) 56(3) McGill LJ 719. 
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ready to practice medicine) and are these changes consistent with quality medical care for 
Canada’s patient population? 
Conscientious Refusal  
The notion of conscientious objection, as claimed by physicians, has been studied 
and written about fairly extensively over the past half century.  This concept is, 
intrinsically, a somewhat difficult one to accept, considering the fact that physicians are 
often imagined to be self-less individuals who are involved in medical care for the benefit 
of their patients and who are expected to divorce their personal feelings, and moral or 
religious beliefs, from the concept of best medical practice for the individuals hoping to 
benefit from their care.  One such perspective is found in the following statement:   
A doctors’ conscience has little place in the delivery of modern medical care.  
What should be provided to patients is defined by the law and consideration of the 
just distribution of finite medical resources, which requires a reasonable 
conception of the patient’s good and the patient’s informed desires.  If people are 
not prepared to offer legally permitted, efficient, and beneficial care to a patient 
because it conflicts with their values, they should not be doctors.  Doctors should 
not offer partial medical services or partially discharge their obligations to care 
for their patients.5 
 
There has been much less written about the concept of conscientious objection as 
it applies to students training in the profession.  When do students develop this self-less 
perspective that is expected of them when they become practicing physicians?  Is this 
perspective of the self-less physician realistic, and what do medical students make of the 
perspective, held by many non-physicians in society, that physicians should not allow 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Julian Savulescu, “Conscientious Objection in Medicine” (2006) 332 BMJ 294 [Savulescu]. 
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their personal biases to influence patients’ access to appropriate and legal medical care in 
our society?  
Recent survey data gathered from British medical students reveal widespread 
acceptance of conscientious objection in medicine, despite the existence of strict 
policies in the UK that discourage conscientious refusals by students to aspects of 
their medical training.6 
 
From this study, and case reports found in the literature, it appears that many medical 
students believe that they have a right to refuse to provide certain types of medical care 
that is otherwise legal, and often publicly funded, if it is in conflict with their own 
personal religious, cultural or ethical beliefs.  How do these beliefs mesh with physicians’ 
codes of ethics, legislation to protect patients’ rights to medical care, and the public’s 
expectation of altruistic behaviour from physicians who are trusted to care for their 
health?  More specifically, how should medical schools deal with requests for exemption 
from certain medical procedures, or medical education sessions, based on conscientious 
objection to participation?  In order to determine the answer to these questions one would 
need to establish: who and what we are training in the medical education process; what 
the end product should look like; whether or not it is possible to accommodate certain 
requests and still create the end product we are looking for; and what role the physician 
should be expected to play in our modern western world where individual rights are often 
thought to be sacrosanct. 
 Each society needs to decide what type of “creature” they are creating when they 
train a student to become a practicing physician.  The route that is taken will, in turn, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Robert F. Card, “Is there no alternative?  Conscientious objection by medical students” (2011) J Med 
Ethics [Card]. 
	  	   6	  
determine the ability of that particular physician to practice in certain countries, and 
within certain areas of those countries.  This paper will not attempt to make a final 
determination of what standard teachings and experiences are required in order to create 
the ideal physician.  Even this will vary from country to country and culture to culture.  
Instead, I will attempt to demonstrate how some accommodation of cultural and religious 
differences might be permitted within the Canadian medical school curriculum, where 
boundaries might reasonably be drawn, what legal and human rights challenges might be 
raised by thwarted students, and how those challenges might be answered within the 
Canadian and International context. 
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Chapter 1:  Conscientious Objection in Medical Care and                             
Medical Education 
The term “conscientious objection” originally referred primarily to the 
circumstance in which an individual recused himself from military involvement because 
of an ethical, moral or religious opposition to some aspect of war.  The process of 
excusing one’s self from certain activities for religious or conscience reasons has 
gradually become more prevalent in all areas of life.  This is certainly the case when it 
comes to health care provision. “The last half of the twentieth century has seen the 
concept of conscientious objection move from a military context into other areas at the 
interface of public and private life, notably becoming a fixture in the medical 
landscape.”7 
Physicians have always introduced their personal biases into the patient care 
scenario, either through the implementation of societal and religious norms or, more 
recently, by way of arguing their rights to personal moral integrity with respect to their 
actions.8  The original Hippocratic Oath9 contains a statement proclaiming that a 
physician will not facilitate an abortion and that he will practice medicine according to 
“divine law”.  In western society, the direct relationship between the legal-administrative 
structure of our communities and the religious beliefs of the members of those 
communities has gradually become less connected, in part because of the growth of 
scientific understanding during the past 100 years.  “As the 20th century progressed, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Nathaniel J. Brown, Conscientious objection in medicine: An hypothesis towards a federated solution, 
(ProQuest, UMI Dissertation Publishing, 2011).  
8 Farr A. Curlin, “Religion, Conscience, and Controversial Clinical Practices” (2007) 356(6) NEJM 593 
[Curlin]. 
9 Hippocratic Oath, History of Medicine Division, National Library of Medicine, National Institutes of 
Health, online: http://www.nlm.nih.gov/hmd/greek/greek_oath.html. 
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association of medical work with a religion eroded; the laboratory bench replaced the 
church pew as the symbolic locus of legitimacy and authority for health-care 
professionals (HCPs).”10 
During the first part of the 20th century, religion as a guiding force was gradually 
replaced by the scientific method, but a “physician knows best” perspective, in 
association with a still poorly educated general public, meant that patriarchy in the 
physician-patient relationship persisted.  It is only in the past quarter century, as society 
began to acknowledge the importance of individual patient’s rights, and patients became 
better educated, that patient autonomy has gradually begun to supersede physicians’ 
perspectives on what is considered best medical treatment.  “Once willing to endorse 
medical paternalism, constitutional and common law jurisprudence now embraces 
patients’ rights to informed consent, bodily autonomy, and self-determination.”11  More 
and more guidelines have been established to try to prevent physicians from allowing 
their own moral and ethical biases to intrude upon the physician-patient relationship.  The 
Physician’s Oath,12 established by the World Medical Association, is an example of one 
such guideline.  Medical regulatory or licensing bodies have also established many of 
these rules, often in the form of codes of ethics.13 14 15  These recommendations tend to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Joel Frader and Charles L. Bosk, “The Personal is Political, the Professional is Not:  Conscientious 
Objection to Obtaining/Providing/Acting on Genetic Information” (2009) 151C American Journal of 
Medical Genetics Part C (Seminars in Medical Genetics) 62 [Frader and Bosk]. 
11 Elizabeth Sepper, “Taking Conscience Seriously” (2012) 98 Virginia Law Review 1501 [Sepper] at 
1507. 
12 The World Medical Association, Declaration of Geneva – Physician’s Oath (1948), online: 
http://www.mma.org.my/Portals/0/Declaration%20of%20Geneva.pdf.     
 
13 Canadian Medial Association (2004) Code of Ethics, “Responsibilities to the Patient”, online: 
http://policybase.cma.ca/dbtw-wpd/PolicyPDF/PD04-06.pdf. (see Appendix) 
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reinforce the established legal concept that the physician owes a duty of care to the 
patient.16  This duty is a fiduciary duty17 and, as such, the physician is expected to place 
the well being of the patient above other considerations.   
Attempts to ensure patients’ rights, and patient autonomy, have resulted in 
significant resistance from some medical practitioners in western society, particularly 
from those individuals who are members of religious communities with doctrines that 
oppose certain types of medical practice.18  This phenomenon has been most significant 
in the United States.   
Physicians, nurses, and pharmacists are increasingly claiming a right to the 
autonomy not only to refuse to provide services they find objectionable, but even 
to refuse to refer patients to another provider and, more recently, to inform them 
of the existence of legal options for care.19 
 
The U.S. government and most state legislatures have introduced legislation designed to 
protect physicians, and other health care workers, from prosecution if they choose not to 
participate in certain aspects of patient care due to perceived conflicts with individual 
religious or ethical ideology.20    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 British Columbia Medical Association (1996) Code of Ethics, “Responsibilities to the Patient”, online:  
https://www.bcma.org/about-bcma/code-ethics.  
  
15 Health Professions Act, RSA 2000, c H-7, s. 25 (2-4). 
16 Norberg v. Wynrib, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 226. 
17 McInerney v. MacDonald, [1992] 2 SCR 138. 
18 Curlin, supra note 8. 
19 R. Alta Charo, “The Celestial Fire of Conscience – Refusing to Deliver Medical Care” (2005) 352(24) 
NEJM 2471 [Charo] at 2471. 
20 Samuel B. Casey, GENERAL COUNSEL& EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT  
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Legislation in almost every state – known as “conscience clauses” – ensures that 
employers accommodate refusal and that refusing doctors and nurses face no 
adverse professional discipline and liability for contravening acceptable medical 
standards.21 
Many of these conscience clauses were passed fairly shortly after Roe v. Wade22 and 
almost all of them refer to abortion as one procedure that physicians should be able to opt 
out of without sanction.23  The Coats Amendment 24 and the Church Amendment 25 are 
examples of this legislative attempt to protect physicians.  They were specifically 
designed to prevent any group receiving government funding from discriminating against 
an individual on the basis of their unwillingness to participate in any facet of abortion 
accessibility. 26 27  Some legislation even permits physicians to avoid notifying patients 
about particular treatment options, or to refuse to refer patients for certain types of care.28 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
ADVOCATES INTERNATIONAL, “The Health Care Right of Conscience” May 2009, online: 
http://www.iirf.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/PDFs/ConscienceHC.pdf at 4. 
21 Sepper, supra note 11 at 1503. 
22 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113. 
23Andis Robeznieks, “Battle of the conscience clause: When practitioners say no - When do medical 
professionals have the right to opt out of treating patients?”, online: http://www.ama-
assn.org/amednews/2005/04/11/prsa0411.htm. 
2442 USC § 238n(c)(2) (1996). 
25 42 USC § 300a-7(e) (1973). 
26 The Coats Amendment prohibits the federal government as well as state and local governments that 
receive federal funds from discriminating against any “participant in a program of training in the health 
professions” who refuses abortion training - Mark R. Wicclair, “Conscience-Based Exemptions for Medical 
Students” (2010) 19 Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 38 at 44. 
27 A section of the Church Amendment states that no “entity” that receives certain federal funds “may deny 
admission or otherwise discriminate against any applicant…because of the applicant’s reluctance, or 
willingness, to counsel, suggest, recommend, assist, or in any way participate in the performance of 
abortions or sterilizations contrary to or consistent with the applicant’s religious beliefs or moral 
convictions” - Mark R. Wicclair, “Conscience-Based Exemptions for Medical Students” (2010) 19 
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 38 at 44-45. 
28 See, e.g., 745 Ill. Comp. Stat. 70/4-5 (2010); Miss. Code Ann. § 41-107-5 (2009); Wash. Rev. Code § 
48.43.065 (2)(a)(2008).  The Illinois statute reads,                                                                                               
No physician or health care personnel shall be civilly or criminally liable…by reason of his or her refusal to 
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The claim of conscientious objection by medical practitioners arises from a belief 
in individual autonomy for all concerned, including the medical personnel who care for 
patients.  This is a relatively new concept.  Historically it was thought that physicians 
would act selflessly in the best interests of their patients – even if that “best interest” was 
a standard decided upon by the physician.29  Many medical organizations and legal 
bodies in the western world now give credence to the concept of conscientious objection 
for physicians and other medical personnel, but they almost always limit this 
accommodation to the non-emergent situation. 30  A physician’s duty to provide medical 
care in the emergency situation has consistently been demonstrated by the courts.31 32 A 
number of organizations also stress that physicians should notify their patients (at the 
beginning of the doctor-patient relationship, if possible) if they have an objection to 
certain medical treatments so that patients are not surprised by this perspective in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
perform, assist, counsel, suggest, recommend, refer or participate in any way in any particular form of 
health care service which is contrary to the conscience of such physician or health care personnel.                                                                                                                                                                   
745 Ill. Comp. stat. 70/4 Health care is defined as                                                                                               
[A]ny phase of patient care, including but not limited to, testing; diagnosis; prognosis; ancillary research; 
instructions; family planning, couselling, referrals, or any other advice in connection with the use or 
procurement of contraceptives and sterilization or abortion procedures; medication; or surgery or other care 
or treatment rendered by a physician or physicians, nurses, paraprofessionals or health care facility, 
intended for the physical, emotional, and mental well-being of persons…(as taken from Elizabeth Sepper, 
“Taking Conscience Seriously” (2012) 98 Virginia Law Review 1501). 
29 Roger Collier, “Professionalism: the historical contract” (2012) 184(11) CMAJ 1233.  
  
30 Principle VI of the AMA’s Principles of Medical Ethics states:  “A physician shall, in the provision of 
appropriate patient care, except in emergencies, be free to choose whom to serve, with whom to associate, 
and the environment in which to provide medical care.”  This Principle appears to grant physicians 
considerable latitude in deciding whether or not to enter into a new patient-physician relationship.  
However, this Principle includes a fundamental exception: from an ethical standpoint, physicians are not 
free to refuse to provide services to patients in need of emergency care.  
 
31 Anne F. Walker, “The legal duty of physicians and hospitals to provide emergency care” (2002) 166(4) 
CMAJ 465 [Walker]. 
 
32 Egedebo v. Windermere District Hospital Association (1993) 78 B.C.L.R. 
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midst of an urgent or emergent medical situation.33  They advance the thesis that 
“practitioners who would place their own spiritual or other interests above their patients’ 
healthcare interests have a conflict of interest, which is unethical if not appropriately 
declared.”34 Some (but not all) of the policy statements allowing conscientious objection 
by physicians state the expectation that physicians will refer patients on to another 
physician who will take over care in a situation where the primary physician is unwilling 
to act.35  “The reconciliation of patients’ rights to care and providers’ rights of 
conscientious objection is in the duty of objectors in good faith to refer their patients to 
reasonably accessible providers who are known not to object.”36   
 There is no specific legislative requirement in Canada for physicians to notify 
patients of potential conflicts of interest, or for them to facilitate patient access to another 
physician in the event of a conflict.  The Canadian Medical Association Code of Ethics 37 
encourages proper patient disposition in such a situation, but does not attempt to mandate 
it. 38 Physicians are told to notify patients of conflicts of interest that might arise within 
the physician-patient relationship and to “resolve them in the best interest of patients.”39  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 “Ethical guidelines on conscientious objection: FIGO Committee for the Ethical Aspects of Human 
Reproduction and Women’s Health”, FIGO Committee Report, (2006) 92 International Journal of 
Gynecology and Obstetrics 333. 
34 Bernard M. Dickens, “Legal Protection and Limits of Conscientious Objection: When Conscientious 
Objection is Unethical” (2009) 28 Med Law 337 [Dickens]. 
35 G.I. Serour, “Ethical guidelines on conscientious objection: FIGO Committee for the Ethical Aspects of 
Human Reproduction and Women’s Health”, FIGO Committee Report, (2006) 92 International Journal of 
Gynecology and Obstetrics 333. 
36 Dickens, supra note 34. 
37 CMA Code of Ethics, online: http://policybase.cma.ca/PolicyPDF/PD04-06.pdf. 
38 Jocelyn Downie and Carla Nassar,  “Barriers to Access to Abortion Through a Legal Lens” (2007) 15 
Health L. J. 143 at 16-17. 
39 CMA Code of Ethics, online: http://policybase.cma.ca/PolicyPDF/PD04-06.pdf at sections 11/12. 
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The College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario expects physicians to notify patients 
if there are any procedures or treatments that the physician would not be willing to 
provide because of his or her religious or moral beliefs.  An OMA Policy Statement also 
declares that “physicians must not withhold information about the existence of a 
procedure or treatment because providing that procedure or giving advice about it 
conflicts with their religious or moral beliefs.”40  The Ontario College of Physicians and 
Surgeons does not specifically require physicians to refer their patients to another 
physician who would be willing to offer the service to the patient that the current 
physician is not able to provide based on religious or moral concerns.  A recent revision 
of the Guideline: Unplanned Pregnancy from the College of Physicians and Surgeons of 
Saskatchewan states that “any physician who is unable to be involved in the further care 
and management of any patient when termination of the pregnancy might be 
contemplated should inform the patient and make an expeditious referral to another 
available physician.”41  
 The specific requirements of organizations that regulate physician behaviour and 
licensure across Canada therefore seem to vary with respect to whether or not they 
require physicians to arrange for alternate care for patients in situations where the 
physician is opposed to a particular type of care for religious or moral reasons.  This 
inconsistency makes it difficult for patients to be able to depend with certainty on the 
continuity of care that they may receive from their physicians when requiring certain 
types of treatment or treatment advice.  This lack of consistency is a concern of members 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Policy Statement #5-08, Physicians and the Ontario Human Rights Code, online: 
http://www.cpso.on.ca/uploadedFiles/downloads/cpsodocuments/policies/policies/human_rights.pdf. 
41 Guideline:  Unplanned Pregnancy, College of Physicians and Surgeons of Saskatchewan, online: 
https://one45.usask.ca/webeval/admin/files/learning_objs/learning_object11149.pdf. 
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of the National Abortion Federation who write that  
If doctors do not wish to refer women for and inform women about their 
comprehensive medical options, including abortion care, then they should not 
participate in the public system. Refusing to refer women for abortion care could 
result in delays that could force women to have later abortions at an increased risk 
to their health.42 
 
Acceptance of the concept of some degree of conscientious objection by 
physicians is now fairly widespread, although there are strong opponents of this 
concept43, and others who would push for broader rights of refusal to provide treatment in 
situations that physicians find morally troubling.  In the United States, “conservative 
advocates have been working at both the state and the federal levels in their campaign to 
enact laws to expand the scope of refusal policies.”44  Some state legislatures have moved 
even further in an attempt to protect the rights of physicians to practice based on 
conscientious beliefs, and to limit patient access to legally available care if that care 
would conflict with the physician’s personal mores.45  These more recent legislative 
advancements seem to directly undermine the idea of the altruistic and caring physician.46  
“Legislation currently being passed in some states and considered in others protects the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 “Has Your Physician Refused to Provide a Referral for Abortion Care?”  
A Patient’s Guide to Action – National Abortion Federation, online: 
http://www.prochoice.org/pubs_research/publications/downloads/canada/patientguide.pdf. 
 
43 Savulescu, supra note 5. 
44 Adam Sonfield, “New Refusal Clauses Shatter Balance Between Provider ‘Conscience,’ Patient Needs”, 
(2004) 7(3) The Guttmacher Report on Public Policy, online:  
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/07/3/gr070301.html. 
45 Mississippi Senate Bill 2619, Health Care Rights of Conscience Act (2004), online: 
http://billstatus.ls.state.ms.us/documents/2004/html/sb/2600-2699/sb2619sg.htm. 
46 B. Jessie Hill.  “Legislative Restrictions on Abortion:  More anti-abortion legislation was passed in the 
United States in 2011 than in any other year since 1973” (2012) 14(2) Virtual Mentor 133. 
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right of conscientious objectors not only to practice their own religious faith but also to 
impose their objections on those of different conscience.”47  
International policies that refer to these issues address patient rights, as well as 
rights of physicians and other health care providers, in terms of the rights of autonomous 
individuals.  The UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
which came into force in 1976, provides in Article 18(1) that: 
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion…[and] to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice 
and teaching.48 
 
This statement has been used to support the idea that individual health workers can refuse 
to provide certain types of health care to patients if the treatment or intervention does not 
meet with their own religious or ethical views.  However, the right to refusal outlined by 
this covenant is not absolute.  Article 18(3) of the Covenant limits conscientious 
objection where it may intrude upon the health, safety and rights of others in society.  
“Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations 
as…are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental 
rights and freedoms of others.” 49   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Rebecca J. Cook and Bernard M. Dickens, “The Growing Abuse of Conscientious Objection” (2006) 
8(5) Virtual Mentor 337 [Cook and Dickens] at 338. 
48 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, UNTS171 
(entered into force 23 March 1976) at Article 18(1). 
49 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, UNTS171 
(entered into force 23 March 1976) at Article 18(3). 
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The World Medical Association Declaration of Geneva (Physician’s Oath) states 
that the physician will always put the needs of his or her patient ahead of any other 
concerns, including considerations of “religion, nationality, race, party politics or social 
standing.”50  This perspective is undermined by state legislatures that pass legislation 
divesting physicians of any responsibility for patient care, even in emergency situations, 
if that care conflicts with deeply held religious or moral beliefs of the physician.  As one 
can see, the idea of a physician as an autonomous individual who can withdraw from 
patient care, even in an emergency situation, is being embraced more frequently in 
western society, particularly in the United States. 
 The “duty to care” in the physician-patient relationship, particularly in the emergent 
situation, is fairly well described in the literature and in national and international 
jurisprudence.  There has been significantly less discussion with respect to the 
responsibilities owed to a patient by a student who is studying to become a practicing 
physician.51  Students do not bear ultimate responsibility for care of the patient and, 
instead, their main goals and responsibilities are to themselves and to the physicians they 
will ultimately become.  A recent survey52 gathered information from British medical 
students, asking them about their beliefs with respect to conscientious objection to 
medical procedures and whether or not they believed that it was acceptable for students to 
refuse to participate in certain aspects of medical training because of particular religious 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 The World Medical Association Declaration of Geneva (1948) Physician's Oath, online: 
http://www.cirp.org/library/ethics/geneva/. 
51 Card, supra note 6. 
52 S.L. Strickland, “Conscientious Objection In Medical Students: A Questionnaire Survey” (2012) 38(1) J 
Med Ethics 22 [Strickland].  
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beliefs or beliefs of conscience.  “Nearly half of the students in this survey stated that 
they believed in the right of doctors to conscientiously object to any procedure.”53  The 
United Kingdom has fairly strict policies that limit the ability of medical students to 
avoid certain types of medical training because of conscientious objection.54  Despite this, 
many students seem to believe that conscientious objection is a reasonable stand to take 
as a medical student or practicing physician.  In the United States, the American Medical 
Association’s Conscience Clause allows students to be exempted from certain medical 
training and/or involvement in certain medical procedures if the educational component 
of the training or procedure can be acquired by the students in some other manner.55   
 Should there be a distinction between conscientious objection for practicing 
physicians and conscientious objection for medical students?  Are the roles different 
enough that there should be a distinction between how conscientious objection is viewed 
between these two groups?  Practicing physicians are licensed to look after patients and 
have a certain responsibility to ensure care is provided for their patients, particularly in 
emergency situations where, it may be argued, the urgency of patient care outweighs any 
moral or ethical concerns that a physician might have with respect to a certain medical 
procedure or activity.  Medical students, on the other hand, are seldom the sole 
individuals responsible for a patient’s well being and it may be more permissible to allow 
students to act based on conscientious beliefs without affecting overall patient care.  Then 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Ibid. 
54 “Good Medical Practice – explanatory guidance”, General Medical Council – Undergraduate Board, 
April 2012, online: http://www.gmc-
uk.org/5___Good_Medical_Practice___explanatory_guidance.pdf_48639321.pdf. 
55 American Medical Association Policy H-295.896 Conscience Clause, online: 
http://www.consciencelaws.org/background/policy/associations-006.aspx. 
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again, we must remember that these students are going to become practicing physicians 
who are, potentially, not able to refuse to provide care in certain circumstances.  This is 
an important consideration to keep in mind when allowing students to avoid certain types 
of medical procedures or training sessions.  It can be argued that the alternative training 
measures, if delivered, must ensure that training physicians are receiving adequate 
education and experience to permit them to practice medicine safely if urgent or 
emergent situations require it in the future.56 This will certainly be possible for certain 
areas of medical training, but may not be as reasonable an option in other situations.  
“There are cases where one must perform the ‘objectionable’ activity itself in order to 
learn the necessary content and underlying principles.”57 
Medical students eventually move into different areas of training and must choose 
what discipline they want to pursue when it comes to post-graduate education (residency 
training).  Certain disciplines train students in areas that are much more likely to 
challenge them in terms of their moral and religious beliefs.  This is particularly the case 
in the discipline of Obstetrics and Gynecology.  Some writers have suggested that 
students should not choose to train in areas that are incompatible with their religious or 
ethical beliefs.58 
  
Conscientious objection makes sense with conscription, but it is worrisome when 
professionals who freely chose their field parse care and withhold information that 
patients need. As the gatekeepers to medicine, physicians and other health care 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Policy re “Religious Observance” and “Opting Out of Educational Experiences Due to Conscientious 
Objections, 2009” University of Rochester School of Medicine and Dentistry, online: 
http://www.urmc.rochester.edu/education/md/documents/student-handbook.pdf at pp. 29-30. 
57 Card, supra note 6. 
58 Ariel Williams, “Conscientious Objection:  A Medical Student Perspective” (2009) 11(9) Virtual Mentor 
686 [Williams]. 
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providers have an obligation to choose specialties that are not moral minefields for 
them.59  
 
There are a number of reasons for and against allowing conscience-based 
exemptions from medical procedures or educational sessions for medical students.  It has 
been argued that it is important to encourage medical students to remain ethical and 
thoughtful in their approach to management of medical problems and care of patients, 
and that refusal of conscience-based requests for exemptions would encourage ethical 
insensitivity in students.60  Refusal to grant conscience-based exemptions may lessen the 
diversity of the student population within a medical school because individuals with a 
religious or cultural background who are opposed to certain aspects of western culture 
(for example - same sex relationships or the use of contraception) will not be able to meet 
the requirements of a western medical education and still maintain the tenets of their 
religion.  Nonetheless, there are certain competing interests that need to be addressed 
when contemplating whether or not to allow someone to opt-out of aspects of medical 
training based on religious or ethical concerns.  “Relevant considerations include:  (1) 
established core educational requirements, (2) local core curricula, (3) non-
discrimination, (4) impact on patients, and (5) impact on students, residents and 
supervisors.”61 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Julie D. Cantor,  “Conscientious Objection Gone Awry – Restoring Selfless Professionalism in 
Medicine” (2009) 360(15) NEJM 1484 [Cantor] at 1485. 
60 Wicclair, Mark R.  Conscientious Objection in Health Care:  An Ethical Analysis (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011) [Wicclair] at 201. 
61 Wicclair, supra note 60 at 201. 
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While examining the issue of conscientious objection and medical school training, 
this thesis will focus on several areas where conscientious objection may arise.  Two of 
these areas of controversy are fairly well recognized in our society: objection to 
abortion/contraception; and, request for exemption from certain duties in order to carry 
out religious observances.  This discussion will also consider the possibility that at some 
future date a Canadian medical student will refuse to perform an examination on 
someone of the opposite sex as part of his or her training process.  This may currently be 
an unfamiliar scenario in Canada, but it is one that has been encountered in the United 
Kingdom62 and it may arise in medical schools in Canada as patterns of immigration 
change and more students of non-European backgrounds begin to train as physicians in 
this country.  These examples will be used to explore the approaches that medical schools 
should take when deciding whether or not to grant exemptions on accommodation 
grounds.  The following chapter will outline the relevant legal framework. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 D. Foggo, A. Taher, “Muslim medical students get picky”, The Times Online.  2007, online:  
www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/health/article2603966.ece. 
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Chapter 2:  Legal Framework 
 
 Medical education generally follows a very structured program, based on the goal 
of teaching human anatomy, physiology, normal function, disease states and the 
management and/or treatment of disease.  Students admitted into this curriculum have, 
heretofore, been expected to proceed through the training process, mastering all areas of 
training and knowledge acquisition before exiting from the program as trained 
physicians.  Recent changes in the population mix within medical school classes have 
challenged ideas about what constitutes an absolute in medical school training, and where 
programs may be modified in order to allow individuals from different religious and 
cultural backgrounds to receive medical training, while still remaining true to their 
religious or cultural roots.   
Medical students have occasionally requested exemption from certain components 
of medical school training for religious or conscience reasons,63 and this process may 
occur more frequently in the future.  What mechanisms could be used by a medical 
student to challenge a refusal to allow that student to opt out of some aspect of medical 
training because of a religious or conscientious objection?  This chapter will describe the 
framework that could be used to develop a mechanism by which both a medical student 
and a college of medicine training program could reach an agreement about how to deal 
with requests for differential treatment within the medical school paradigm.  In order to 
develop this mechanism, I will identify the rationale behind the concept of reasonable 
accommodation, and the methods that a student might follow to achieve their goal if a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Card, supra note 6. 
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request for accommodation is denied.   Potential legal mechanisms available to the 
student would fall within the ambit of human rights legislation or under the guidelines of 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  Appraisal of these legal mechanisms 
could ultimately lead to a technique of guiding policies for medical schools that are trying 
to establish fair and reproducible means of accommodating differences. 
2.1 Reasonable Accommodation  
 Reasonable accommodation is a method of dealing with requests for 
differential treatment and is a common component of human rights legislation.  
Reasonable accommodation refers to the act of accommodating differences between 
groups of people within the fabric of our society.  The requirement for reasonable 
accommodation assumes that there is behaviour that is different than, or infringes upon, 
the belief system, or cultural norms of another segment of society.  Discussion of 
reasonable accommodation attempts to discern when, and why, one would allow for these 
differences to exist, rather than forcing outliers to meet accepted societal norms through 
legislative directive, or through challenge via the courts.  This is often seen from the 
perspective of the “dominant” group that is having their norm “challenged” by the 
atypical behaviour or differential request.  
The concept of reasonable accommodation was first introduced in the United 
States Civil Rights Act64 of 1968.65  This Act mandated that religious practices be 
accommodated in the work force “unless an accommodation would cause undue hardship 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub.L. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73, enacted April 11, 1968. (within Title 25, 
sections 1301 to 1303 of the United States Code) 
65 The Concept of Reasonable Accommodation in Selected National Disability Legislation, UN Enable 
A/AC.265/2006/CRP.1, online: http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/ahc7bkgrndra.htm [UN 
Enable]. 
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on the employer’s business.”66  This accommodation is defined, and limited, by legal 
requirements, both common law and statutory, but is also shaped by societal mores and 
by the particular ideology within the society itself. “Reasonable accommodation is a legal 
notion.  This notion stems from jurisprudence in the realm of labour and indicates a form 
of relaxation aimed at combating discrimination caused by the strict application of a 
norm, which, in certain of its effects, infringes on a citizen’s right to equality.”67  One 
cannot legally allow a behaviour that is proscribed by law, but beyond that, behaviour is 
permitted, or is subject to sanction, by groups or individuals based on differing views as 
to where a line should be drawn between permitting an activity or behaviour, versus 
disallowing it.   
Reasonable accommodation of religious practice, that infringes, or has the 
potential to infringe, on others’ space in society, is decided upon and informed by the 
religious and cultural beliefs of the people assessing the behaviour.  It is limited by the 
extent to which it infringes upon individual or group rights and goals, as well as the 
discomfort it may create in groups or individuals affected by the behaviour.  It is also 
limited by legal precepts that outline restrictions to certain types of manifestations of 
religious belief.  Freedom of conscience would, theoretically, be limited by similar 
societal mores and legal rules that bar certain manifestations of religious belief (e.g. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 The Concept of Reasonable Accommodation in Selected National Disability Legislation, UN Enable 
A/AC.265/2006/CRP.1, online: http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/ahc7bkgrndra.htm [UN 
Enable]. 
67 Gérard Bouchard and Charles Taylor,  BUILDING THE FUTURE  
A Time for Reconciliation, Abridged Report, online: http://red.pucp.edu.pe/wp-
content/uploads/biblioteca/buildingthefutureGerardBouchardycharlestaylor.pdf. 
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discrimination against women or homosexuals), but the boundaries associated with 
freedom of conscience are still not very well defined by our Canadian legal system.  
2.2 Reasonable Accommodation and Human Rights Legislation 
 
What are the limits of reasonable accommodation and how are they determined in 
Canadian society?  Ensuring the provision of reasonable accommodation is an important 
part of Federal and Provincial human rights legislation. 
2.2.1  Federal 
 “The duty to accommodate arises from two federal statutes: the Canadian Human 
Rights Act and the Employment Equity Act.”68  The duty to accommodate refers to the 
obligation of an employer, service provider, or union to take steps to eliminate 
disadvantage to employees, prospective employees or clients resulting from a rule, 
practice, or physical barrier that has or may have an adverse impact on individuals or 
groups protected under the Canadian Human Rights Act, or identified as a designated 
group under the Employment Equity Act.69 Human rights commissions deal primarily 
with complaints of discrimination.  Some prohibited grounds of discrimination are listed 
in section 3 of the Canadian Human Rights Act. 
3(1) For all purposes of this Act, the prohibited grounds of discrimination are 
race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, age, sex, sexual orientation, 
marital status, family status, disability and conviction for an offence for which a 
pardon has been granted or in respect of which a record suspension has been 
ordered.70 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Canadian Human Rights Commission, online: http://www.chrc-ccdp.ca/discrimination/apfa_uppt/page1-
eng.aspx. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Canadian Human Rights Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. H-6) , s. 3. 
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Discriminatory practices that distinguish between individuals based on these prohibited 
grounds of discrimination are dealt with in sections 5 and 10 of the Canadian Human 
Rights Act.71  In particular, section 10 serves to prevent discrimination that would affect 
training or apprenticeship and, therefore, limit access to future employment. 
 
10. It is a discriminatory practice for an employer, employee organization or 
employer organization 
(b) to enter into an agreement affecting recruitment, referral, hiring, promotion, 
training, apprenticeship, transfer or any other matter relating to employment or 
prospective employment that deprives or tends to deprive an individual or class of 
individuals of any employment opportunities on a prohibited ground of 
discrimination.72 
 
 
 
 2.2.2  Provincial 
 
 Provincial human rights codes stipulate similar guidelines and rules to those 
established within the Canadian Human Rights Act.  Education is a provincial 
responsibility and any human rights complaint initiated by a medical student would likely 
be dealt with through provincial human rights legislation.  Section 13(1) of the Manitoba 
Human Rights Code, for example, states that  
No person shall discriminate with respect to any service, accommodation, facility, 
good, right, licence, benefit, program or privilege available or accessible to the 
public or to a section of the public, unless bona fide and reasonable cause exists for 
the discrimination.73 
 
Statements such as this within Provincial human rights may be important with respect to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Canadian Human Rights Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. H-6), s. 5, s. 10. 
72 Ibid., s. 10. 
73 The Human Rights Code, CCSM c H175, s. 13(1). 
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the ability of a College of Medicine to “discriminate” if “bona fide and reasonable cause” 
exist(s).  Section 14(2)(c) of the Manitoba Human Rights Code identifies that the code 
applies to any aspect of an employment or occupation, including “training, advancement 
or promotion”.74  The Saskatchewan Human Rights Code 75 contains a bill of rights that 
includes freedom of conscience and freedom of religion for all citizens of the province. 
 4 Every person and every class of persons shall enjoy the right to freedom of  
 conscience, opinion and belief and freedom of religious association, teaching,  
 practice and worship.76 
 
The Saskatchewan Human Rights Code also specifically addresses the right to education 
saying that 
   
13(1) Every person and every class of persons shall enjoy the right to education in 
any school, college, university or other institution or place of learning, vocational 
training or apprenticeship without discrimination on the basis of a prohibited 
ground other than age.77 
 
 
  
 
2.3 Addressing a Human Rights Claim 
The framework for proving a human rights claim (proving a prima facie 
complaint) involves the process of establishing that the individual or individuals involved 
have been subject to treatment with respect to a prohibited ground of the code and that 
the burden associated with that treatment falls within a sphere of activity covered by the 
code.  A prohibited ground might include race or religion, and a protected sphere of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 The Human Rights Code, CCSM c H175, s. 14(2)(c). 
75 Saskatchewan Human Rights Code, SS 1979, c S-24.1. 
76 Ibid., s. 4. 
77 Saskatchewan Human Rights Code, SS 1979, c S-24.1, s. 13(1). 
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activity could include such things as access to employment, health or education. A 
complainant can also claim discrimination based on adverse effects – wherein a rule or 
procedure that treats everyone alike (a “neutral rule”) results in differential treatment to 
one group of people in comparison to another.  Once a complainant is able to demonstrate 
inequitable treatment with respect to a prohibited ground, and within a recognized sphere 
of activity, prima facie discrimination is held to have occurred unless the respondent 
negates, rebuts or justifies this differential treatment. If discrimination is established, the 
burden of proof lies on the respondent to show why this discriminatory rule or process 
should be allowed.78  A human rights tribunal would need to determine if there is “real” 
discrimination occurring that warrants liability on behalf of the respondent, if no 
reasonable explanation for this differential treatment can be advanced.   
All of the normative questions that finally determine liability occur at this stage.  
Did the respondent have some “good” reason for the requirement imposed?  What 
counts as a good reason?  What would be the consequences for the operation of its 
enterprise of having to dispense with or change the requirement?  Is it asking too 
much to make the respondent go this far in order to avoid the differential effect 
imposed by its practice or policy?79 
 
 When looking at human rights legislation, in terms of the declaration expected from 
the respondent in order to legitimize this differential treatment or discriminatory result, 
answers to several questions must be provided.  Is there evidence that this rule or practice 
is necessary for successful function of the particular business or enterprise?  Did the 
respondent act in honesty and good faith in implementing this differential rule?  Is it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Kelly v. University of British Columbia (No. 3) (2012), CHRR Doc. 12-0032, 2012 BCHRT 32 at para. 
451. 
79 Denise Réaume, “Defending the Human Rights Codes from the Charter” (2012) 9 J.L. & Equality 67 at 
para. 11. 
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impossible to accommodate the complainant without creating undue hardship on the 
respondent or undermining the purpose and/or function of the enterprise?80  If these 
questions demonstrate an honest rationale behind the rule, then discrimination may not be 
identified. 
 Germane to this process, the Meiorin 81 case involved a female firefighter who lost 
her job because she did not meet the fitness requirements established by the government 
of British Columbia.  In addition to addressing the specifics of this particular case, the 
Court in the Meiorin case attempted to develop a consistent method of identifying and 
proving discrimination, regardless of the sphere of activity within which the complainant 
was participating.  The Meiorin Test serves to evaluate a standard that is developed as a 
requirement for employment within a particular work place. 
 
An employer may justify the impugned standard by establishing on the balance of 
probabilities: 
(1)     that the employer adopted the standard for a purpose rationally connected 
to the performance of the job; 
  
(2)     that the employer adopted the particular standard in an honest and good 
faith belief that it was necessary to the fulfilment of that legitimate work-
related purpose; and 
 
(3)    that the standard is reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of that 
legitimate work-related purpose.  To show that the standard is  reasonably 
necessary, it must be demonstrated that it is impossible to accommodate 
individual employees sharing the characteristics of the claimant without imposing 
undue hardship upon the employer.82 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. British Columbia Government 
Service Employees' Union 1999 SCC 48, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 3. [Meiorin]. 
81 Ibid. 
82	  Meiorin, supra note 80 at para. 54. 
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 If an individual requests differential treatment, but this request is refused by an 
employer, then a human rights challenge might look to the Meiorin Test to determine if 
refusal to accommodate this request is reasonable.  In British Columbia (Superintendent 
of Motor Vehicles) v. British Columbia (Council of Human Rights)83, Justice McLachlin 
determined that the Meiorin Test applies to all situations of discrimination where 
accommodation may be possible.  The Meiorin Test requires those governed by human 
rights legislation to accommodate the characteristics of affected groups when demanding 
particular standards, or show why accommodation is not possible.  Once a plaintiff 
establishes that a standard is prima facie discriminatory, the onus shifts to the defendant 
to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that the discriminatory standard is a bona fide 
occupational requirement or that there is a bona fide and reasonable justification for 
maintaining	  the impugned standard.84 
Bona fide occupational requirement (BFOR) is a term that applies in human 
rights law and refers to a work requirement that has been established and is thought to be 
necessary for a job to be performed properly or efficiently.  The concept of a BFOR was 
discussed in detail by the Supreme Court of Canada in Canadian National Railway Co. v. 
Canada (Human Rights Comm.) and Bhinder (1985).85  The majority in that case 
determined that a work rule or requirement that is based on a genuine BFOR should be 
upheld, even if it appears to discriminate against certain factions of society.  This 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) v. British Columbia (Council of  
Human Rights), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 868.  
 
84 Ibid.  
 
85 Canadian National Railway Co. v. Canada (Human Rights Comm.) and Bhinder (1985), 7 C.H.R.R. 
D/3093 (S.C.C.) [Bhinder]. 
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decision was thought to be consistent with statements found within the Canadian Human 
Rights Code (previously section 14(a)).  
15. (1) It is not a discriminatory practice if 
(a) any refusal, exclusion, expulsion, suspension, limitation, specification or 
preference in relation to any employment is established by an employer to be 
based on a bonafide occupational requirement.86 
 
“A working condition does not lose its character as a bona fide occupational requirement 
because it may be discriminatory. Rather, as a bona fide occupational requirement, it may 
permit consequential discrimination, if any.”87  It appears from this case that there are 
bona fide occupational requirements that are considered non-negotiable, even if no 
consideration of undue hardship is made in the context of the request advanced.  This 
viewpoint was challenged by Dickson C.J. who would have allowed the appeal, 
determining that a BFOR did not exist unless undue hardship was proven.   
 
The words "occupational requirement" refer to a requirement manifestly related to 
the occupation as a whole. The qualifying words "bona fide" require an employer 
to justify the imposition of an occupational requirement on a particular individual 
when such imposition has discriminatory effects on the individual. A requirement 
which is prima facie discriminatory against an individual, even if occupational, is 
not bona fide for the purposes of s. 14(a) if its application to the individual is not 
reasonably necessary in the sense that undue hardship would result on the part of 
the employer if an exception or substitution were to be allowed on the part of the 
individual affected.88 
 
The method of determining whether or not something is a BFOR was revisited in the 
Meiorin case (British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Canadian Human Rights Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. H-6), s. 15(1)(a). 
87 Bhinder, supra note 85. 
88 Bhinder, supra note 85. 
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BCGSEU (1999 35 C.H.R.R. D/257 (S.C.C.)) and specific criteria were outlined that 
included the necessity of proving undue hardship in the final step of the analysis.89   
Undue hardship is a somewhat vague concept and has a subjective quality to it.  When 
accommodation of an employee would result in undue hardship to the employer, then the 
requirement that is being challenged is likely a BFOR.  When something is definitely a 
BFOR, undue hardship would, as a matter of course, result from removing it from the 
employment situation.  These two components provide checks and balances against the 
advancement of discriminatory decision-making.  
A recent Supreme Court of Canada case looked to human rights legislation in 
determining that a student was discriminated against when a particular special education 
program was cancelled, and that the discriminatory action was not justifiable.  Moore v. 
B.C.90 was heard, on appeal91 from the British Columbia Court of Appeal, on March 22, 
2012.  This case involved a claim of lack of substantive equality for children with 
learning disabilities (in this case – dyslexia) with respect to their access to public school 
education within the province of British Columbia.  The BC Human Rights Tribunal 
found that discrimination had occurred when the School District cut funding to services 
for learning disabled students, thereby undermining these students’ access to public 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 A three-step test should be adopted for determining whether an employer has established, on a balance of 
probabilities, that a prima facie discriminatory standard is a bona fide occupational requirement (BFOR). First,  
the employer must show that it adopted the standard for a purpose rationally connected to the performance of the 
job.  The focus at the first step is not on the validity of the particular standard, but rather on the validity of its  
general purpose. Second, the employer must establish that it adopted the particular standard in an honest and 
good faith belief that it was necessary to the fulfilment of that legitimate work-related purpose. Third, the 
employer must establish that the standard is reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of that legitimate work-
related purpose. To show that the standard is reasonably necessary, it must be demonstrated that it is impossible 
to accommodate individual employees sharing the characteristics of the claimant without imposing undue 
hardship upon the employer.  
 
90 Moore v. British Columbia (Education), 2012 SCC 61. 
91 British Columbia (Ministry of Education) v. Moore, 2010 BCCA 478. 
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education services.  The case was heard by the BC Supreme Court, which overturned the 
decision of the tribunal.  It was then referred on to the BCCA and 2 of 3 judges dismissed 
the appeal.  A third judge dissented and her written reasons focused on a section 15 
analysis of the case and the need to ensure that reasonable accommodation had occurred.  
The Moores were given leave to appeal the case to the SCC and the appeal was heard on 
March 22nd, 2012.  The appeal was allowed.  The Court determined that Jeffrey Moore 
was discriminated against when his special education program was cancelled due to 
financial constraints.  The Court agreed with the Tribunal finding that  
the District faced financial difficulties during the relevant period. Yet it also found 
that cuts were disproportionably made to special needs programs…. More 
significantly, the Tribunal found that the District undertook no assessment, 
financial or otherwise, of what alternatives were or could be reasonably available to 
accommodate special needs students if the Diagnostic Centre were closed. The 
failure to consider financial alternatives completely undermined the District's 
argument that it was justified in providing no meaningful access to an education for 
J because it had no choice. In order to decide that it had no other choice, it had at 
least to consider what those other choices were.92   
 
In other words, the Court determined that the District did not make a meaningful attempt 
at accommodation of the Moores’ requests.  “Accommodation is necessarily a fact-driven 
inquiry.  Among the relevant factors adjudicators will consider are the costs associated 
with the possible method of accommodation and safety issues.”93 
Human rights legislation provides one avenue for pursuing complaints about 
perceived discrimination in a medical school situation and its application to these issues 
will be examined in Chapter 3.   Another option that a medical student might choose 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Moore v. British Columbia (Education), 2012 SCC 61. 
93 Heather M. MacNaughton and Jessica Connell, “A Delicate Balance:  The Challenges Faced By Our 
Democratic Institutions in Reconciling the Competing Rights and Interests of a Diverse Population” (2011) 
44 UBC L Rev 149 at para 19. 
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would be to challenge a decision not to accommodate a request for differential treatment 
by launching a legal challenge using the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  How would 
the Charter apply in situations where there has been a request by medical students for 
accommodation of specific religious, cultural or conscience-based beliefs?  Could a 
refusal to accommodate such a request result in a Charter challenge by the student?  
Does the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms even apply to universities? 
 
 
2.4 Does the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms Apply to 
Universities? 
 Section 32(1)94 of the Charter describes what rules and regulations are subject to 
this component of the constitution.95  A literal reading of section 32(1) finds that the 
reach of the Charter is limited to legislation crafted by the government of each province 
and by the Parliament of Canada.  This concept seems fairly straightforward but is less 
conclusive than one might initially suppose. In Dolphin Delivery,96 the Court attempted 
to place some boundaries on the reach of the Charter, based specifically on a reading of 
section 32(1).  Over time, the Court has broadened the potential application of the 
Charter, allowing that it pertains to a number of cases in which the arm of the 
government is seen to be controlling aspects of the private sphere.  The Charter has been 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Charter, supra note 3 at section 32(1). 
95 32. (1) This Charter applies 
a) to the Parliament and government of Canada in respect of all matters within the authority of Parliament 
including all matters relating to the Yukon Territory and Northwest Territories; and 
b) to the legislature and government of each province in respect of all matters within the authority of the 
legislature of each province. 
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found to apply to "many forms of delegated legislation, regulations, orders in council, 
possibly municipal by‑laws, and by‑laws and regulations of other creatures of 
Parliament and the Legislatures."97  More recent judgments of the Supreme Court of 
Canada have determined that “the Charter may apply to the actions of a delegated 
decision maker acting pursuant to statutory authority.”98 Strictly private actors are not 
subject to Charter scrutiny, but bodies performing governmental work may be subject to 
assessment under the Charter. “Also included are those Crown corporations and public 
agencies that are outside the formal departmental structure, but which, by virtue of 
ministerial control or express statutory stipulation, are deemed to be "agents" of the 
Crown.”99   
 In McKinney v. University of Guelph100 Chief Justice Dickson and Justices La 
Forest and Gonthier determine that a university is not subject to the Charter, stating that 
“the fact that an entity is a creature of statute and has been given the legal attributes of a 
natural person is not sufficient to make its actions subject to the Charter.” 101  The Court 
does, however, leave the door open to the possibility that particular entities that are not 
obviously governmental bodies might be subject to the Charter if they meet certain 
criteria.   
I would favour an approach that asks the following questions about entities that are 
not self-evidently part of the legislative, executive or administrative branches of 
government:  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 Ibid. 
98 Pridgen v. University of Calgary, 2010 ABQB 644 [Pridgen] at para. 34. 
99 Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, Student Edition. (Toronto: Carswell, 2008) at pp. 784-5. 
 
100 McKinney v. University of Guelph, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229 [McKinney].  
 
101 McKinney, supra note 100.  
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1.  Does the legislative, executive or administrative branch of government    
exercise general control over the entity in question? 
2.Does the entity perform a traditional government function or a function which in 
more modern times is recognized as a responsibility of the state?  
3. Is the entity one that acts pursuant to statutory authority specifically granted to it 
to enable it to further an objective that government seeks to promote in the broader 
public interest?  
Each of these questions is meant to identify aspects of government in its 
contemporary context.  An affirmative answer to one or more of these questions 
would, to my mind, be a strong indicator that one is dealing with an entity that 
forms part of government. “102 
 
 
Further broadening of the perspective that the Charter applies only to governmental 
legislation and activity is found in Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General).103  In 
this case a hospital failed to provide sign language interpretation for deaf patients.  The 
patients argued that lack of this service infringed their ability to receive adequate medical 
care as they were unable to communicate effectively with their physicians and with other 
health care practitioners.  Justice La Forest for the Supreme Court determined that the 
Charter applies to a hospital that is carrying out government policy with respect to health 
service implementation.  In Eldridge, the Court found that there were two ways in which 
the Charter may apply to specific legislation.  First, legislation may be unconstitutional 
because it violates a Charter right.  
Secondly, the Charter may be infringed, not by the legislation itself, but by the 
actions of a delegated decision-maker in applying it.  In such cases, the legislation 
remains valid, but a remedy for the unconstitutional action may be sought pursuant 
to s. 24(1) of the Charter.104   
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103 Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624 [Eldridge]. 
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La Forest also states “there is no doubt…that the Charter also applies to action taken 
under statutory authority.”105  That does not mean that every body created by the 
government is subject to Charter review.  Corporations may be created by statute but 
then function autonomously, without government interference.  Depending upon the 
particular circumstance, and the meaning of “government” as defined under section 32106, 
some of these statutory entities may need to function within Charter guidelines. 
 
 “A private entity may be subject to the Charter in respect of certain inherently 
governmental actions… The rationale for this principle is readily apparent. Just as 
governments are not permitted to escape Charter scrutiny by entering into 
commercial contracts or other "private" arrangements, they should not be allowed 
to evade their constitutional responsibilities by delegating the implementation of 
their policies and programs to private entities.”107  
 
 
Therefore, a private entity that is carrying out a public purpose is not necessarily subject 
to Charter review.  “In order for the Charter to apply to a private entity, it must be found 
to be implementing a specific governmental policy or program.”108 
 In R. v. Whatcott,109 the appellant was charged with littering contrary to a bylaw 
that had been enacted by the University of Regina, pursuant to a statute that allowed the 
University of Regina to pass bylaws governing traffic and parking issues on university 
grounds.  “The Court found that while the University of Regina was independent from 
government, it attracted Charter scrutiny in the performance of certain governmental 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 Ibid.,  at para. 21. 
106 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11, 
section 32. 
107 Eldridge, supra note 103 at para. 42.  
108 Eldridge, supra note 103. 
109 R. v. Whatcott, 2002 SKQB 399, 225 Sask. R. 205 [Whatcott]. 
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activities.”110  “By enacting the bylaws the University is essentially carrying out the 
purposes of ss. 90.1 to 90.3 of the Act.  It is engaged in governmental action which may 
bring an individual before the courts in the same manner as a Federal, Provincial or 
municipal law.”111 
 In Pridgen v. University of Calgary112, a case involving two students who were 
disciplined for non-academic misconduct by the university, the Court determined that the 
University of Calgary was not a part of the government per se, but that the actions taken 
by it were in relation to implementation of a government program (Post-Secondary 
Learning Act (PSL)) and, therefore, that this activity was subject to assessment under the 
Charter.  
I find that the University is tasked with implementing a specific government 
policy for the provision of accessible post secondary education to the public in 
Alberta, thus bringing the facts of this case into line with Eldridge. The structure 
of the PSL Act reveals that in providing post-secondary education, universities in 
Alberta carry out a specific government objective.113  
 
The judge found that the program, as well as actions specifically related to that program, 
such as discipline of students, fit within a statutory framework, created by government.   
 
I find that the nature of the activity being undertaken by the University here, 
imposing disciplinary sanctions, fits more comfortably within the analytical 
framework of statutory compulsion. The issue is whether in disciplining students 
pursuant to authority granted under the PSL Act, the University must be Charter 
compliant. The statutory authority includes the power to impose serious sanctions 	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111 Whatcott, supra note 109 at para. 44. 
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that go beyond the authority held by private individuals or organizations. Those 
sanctions include the power to fine, the power to suspend a student’s right to attend 
the university, and the power to expel students from the university: PSL Act, section 
31. Accordingly, Charter protection for students’ fundamental freedoms, including 
freedom of expression, applies in these circumstances. This goes to the fundamental 
purpose of the Charter as noted by Wilson J. at 222 of her dissent in McKinney, 
where she stated that those who enacted the Charter “were concerned to provide 
some protection for individual freedom and personal autonomy in the face of 
government’s expanding role”. “114   
 
In this Court of Appeal decision, Justice Paperny moved more definitely toward 
determining that universities are governmental bodies, dependent upon government 
funding and integral to societal function.  She interpreted McKinney as leaving the door 
open to the possibility that aspects of university function may be subject to Charter 
review, depending upon what government role the university has adopted. She upheld the 
Court of Queen’s Bench decision in support of the perspective that the disciplinary 
proceedings carried out by the University of Calgary were subject to Charter review.  
 The importance of this case, as it relates to the subject matter of this thesis, is 
critical.  What recourse would a student have if he or she were to request exemption from 
specific aspects of medical training, either within the confines of medical training, or as a 
request in anticipation of being accepted into a College of Medicine?  Justice Paperny’s 
writings seem to directly address this issue, stating that decisions made by a university 
body that might serve to inhibit a student from graduating from a professional college, 
should be a public concern and open to assessment. 
 
 Access to post-secondary education is a pressing public concern. The sanctions  
available to the Review Committee here, which include denial of access to public 
post-secondary education for the affected students, can have consequences as 
serious for one’s ability to practice in one’s chosen field as the actions of a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 Pridgen v. University of Calgary, 2012 ABCA 139 [Pridgen CA] at para. 105. 
	  	   39	  
professional regulator. In the case of many professional schools, such as medicine, 
dentistry or law, the university acts as gatekeeper to the profession as much as any 
regulatory body. 115 
 
From the Pridgen case, particularly the decision from the Court of Appeal in Alberta, it 
appears that more and more aspects of university function may be subject to Charter 
review – at least until this perspective is addressed by the Supreme Court of Canada. 
 The recent decision by the Supreme Court of Canada in Doré116 suggests that an 
administrative body (such as an appeals board of a university), exercising power under a 
statute, would be required to make decisions through application of administrative law 
rules (rather than an Oakes type of analysis) using the standard of review of 
reasonableness to take Charter values into account.  The decision would need to balance 
the proportionality of various rights, attempting to determine “has the decision-maker 
disproportionately, and therefore unreasonably, limited a Charter right.”117  However, it 
is likely that the Charter would still be applied in the usual fashion when there is a 
challenge to a specific policy created by a body like a university or medical school. 
 
2.5   Reasonable Accommodation and the Charter 
Components of the Charter that are most relevant to this discussion include 
sections 2(a), 15 and, to a lesser degree, section 7.  How have the relevant components of 
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms been used to deal with discrimination or differential 
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treatment?  Informing this discussion is the 2009 SCC case Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren 
of Wilson Colony in which McLachlin C.J. states that 
Minimal impairment and reasonable accommodation are conceptually distinct. 
Reasonable accommodation is a concept drawn from human rights statutes and 
jurisprudence. It envisions a dynamic process whereby the parties — most 
commonly an employer and employee — adjust the terms of their relationship in 
conformity with the requirements of human rights  legislation, up to the point at 
which accommodation would mean undue hardship for the accommodating 
party.118 
 
She writes that there is a distinction that exists between the attempt to accommodate the 
rights of an individual, and the need for Parliament to design laws for the betterment of 
society.  She argues that the constitutionality of a law (as determined by a Charter 
analysis) should be assessed via a section 1 analysis that takes into account the law’s 
effect on society as a whole.  
The broader societal context in which the law operates must inform the s. 1 
justification analysis.  A law’s constitutionality under s. 1 of the Charter is 
determined, not by whether it is responsive to the unique needs of every 
individual claimant, but rather by whether its infringement of Charter rights is 
directed at an important objective and is proportionate in its overall impact. While 
the law’s impact on the individual claimants is undoubtedly a significant factor 
for the court to consider in determining whether the infringement is justified, the 
court’s ultimate perspective is societal. The question the court must answer is 
whether the Charter infringement is justifiable in a free and democratic society, 
not whether a more advantageous arrangement for a particular claimant could be 
envisioned.119 
   
And further, 
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Similarly, “undue hardship”, a pivotal concept in reasonable accommodation,  is 
not easily applicable to a legislature enacting laws… Rather than strain to adapt 
“undue hardship” to the context of s. 1 of the Charter, it is better to speak in terms 
of minimal impairment and proportionality of effects.120 
 
Therefore, from this recent Supreme Court of Canada case, we have the view that human 
rights legislation focuses more specifically on the individual, and how accommodations 
can allow the individual to exist and succeed in a particular work or education 
environment.  The Charter, on the other hand, while written with the individual in mind, 
has a strong override component in section 1 that seeks to find ways to “minimally 
impair” the rights of the individual, while ensuring the rights and needs of society as a 
whole. 
   
2.5.1 Section 2(a) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
2. Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: 
(a) freedom of conscience and religion  
 
The wording of section 2(a) of the Charter seems to promise limitless freedom of 
conscience and religion, including, one might assume, the unfettered right to practice the 
tenets of a particular faith or ideology.  In reality, there are significant limits to these 
rights, due to the fact that this “freedom” is not occurring in isolation.  The limits of these 
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rights are ultimately determined by the courts and specifically relate to manifestations of 
religious belief 121 as there is, so far, no legal attempt to limit religious belief itself.  
 The courts have had to balance the right to freedom of religion and conscience 
against other rights in Canadian society, and have chosen to support the right to represent 
certain manifestations of religious belief and/or freedom of conscience “provided that 
such manifestations do not injure his or her neighbours or their parallel rights to hold and 
manifest beliefs and opinions of their own.”122  It is important to distinguish the right to 
hold specific beliefs from the right to act on the basis of those beliefs.  “The freedom to 
hold beliefs is much broader than the freedom to manifest those beliefs in a 
discriminatory way, because the freedom of religion co-exists with equality rights.”123  
Contravention of section 2(a) of the Charter does not, of course, necessarily 
invalidate legislation.  As with other Charter guarantees, freedom of religion is subject to 
a limitation as determined by section 1 analysis.  “The Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable 
limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society.”124  Section 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is the section that 
confirms that the rights listed in the Charter are guaranteed.  It is also known as the 
reasonable limits, or limitations clause.  It legally allows the government to limit an 
individual's Charter rights if certain criteria are met.  “[The Supreme] Court has clearly 	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recognized that freedom of religion can be limited when a person’s freedom to act in 
accordance with his or her beliefs may cause harm to or interfere with the rights of 
others.”125  Section 1 analysis follows the general outline prescribed by the Oakes test.126  
There are two specific criteria that need to be met in order to confirm that a limitation of 
a right, or freedom, is justified.  The objective of the limitation must be sufficiently 
important to warrant undermining a right that would otherwise be guaranteed under the 
Charter.  The objective must relate to concerns that are “pressing and substantial.”  If that 
is confirmed, then the means used to limit the right or freedom must be shown to be 
“reasonable and demonstrably justified.”  A type of proportionality test is mandated, 
comprised of three components.  Proportionality is confirmed by demonstrating that: the 
means must be rationally connected to the objective (they must not be arbitrary or unfair); 
there must be minimal impairment of rights; and there must be proportionality between 
the infringement and the objective. 
The Canadian jurisprudence on freedom of religion has numerous examples of 
courts accepting certain circumstances as violations of the freedom of religion, 
but going on to decide that the violation of freedom of religion is reasonable 
under the section 1 limitation.127   
The first freedom of religion case to reach the Supreme Court of Canada post-
Charter was Big M Drug Mart.128 Big M challenged the requirement, outlined by the 
Lord’s Day Act, that all stores must close on Sundays in order to observe the Christian 
Sabbath.  Big M argued that this Act violated its employees’ freedom of religion, as 	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guaranteed by the Charter, as employees were being forced to take a day off to 
“celebrate” a religious holiday that was not a part of their own personal religion.  The 
Supreme Court agreed that this Act constituted a violation of freedom of religion and 
concluded that “freedom of religion includes freedom from religion.”129  
 Beginning with Big M in 1985, the right to religious belief has been given a broad 
reading.  Religious belief, and freedom of conscience, are generally accepted on their 
own merit, without need for definitive external validation.  As long as an individual 
honestly holds a particular religious belief, and acts on that belief, then that belief is 
afforded Charter protection.  An example of this is seen in Syndicat Northcrest v. 
Amselem.130  In this case, orthodox Jewish residents built temporary homes (succahs) on 
the balconies of their condominiums as part of a religious celebration.  Condominium 
bylaws prohibited decoration, alteration or any sort of construction on the balconies of 
the buildings.  The residents were offered the opportunity to build a communal succah in 
the gardens but this was objected to by these residents who said that their religious beliefs 
required them to have individual succahs on their balconies.  The trial judge ruled against 
the residents, finding that the objective obligatory requirement of Judaism did not, 
apparently, require the building of individual succahs.  The Supreme Court allowed the 
appeal, establishing that “freedom of religion under the Quebec (and the Canadian) 
Charter does not require a person to prove that his or her religious practices are 
supported by any mandatory doctrine of faith.”131  The Supreme Court found that the 	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condominium bylaws interfered with the right of the Jewish residents to practice their 
religious beliefs, and that the interference was more than trivial – thus leading to an 
infringement of that right.  From this case, we receive the determination that, in order for 
a religious belief to be supported under the Charter,  
the claimant must establish that he or she has a sincere belief and that this belief is 
objectively connected to a religious precept that follows from a text or another 
article of faith.  It is not necessary to prove that the precept objectively creates an 
obligation, but it must be established that the claimant sincerely believes he or she 
is under an obligation that follows from the precept.132  
  
Boundaries of this belief are vague, and are defined by the statement that interference 
with manifestation of belief that is more than “trivial” will not be permitted under the 
Charter unless justified under section 1.  “The context of each case must be examined to 
ascertain whether the interference is more than trivial or insubstantial.”133  As can be 
anticipated by this broad determination of what constitutes religious belief and practice, 
many challenges under section 2(a) have been successful at the first stage of analysis, 
with a finding of more than trivial interference in many cases. 
 As was previously recognized by La Forest J. in B. (R.) v. Children’s Aid Society of 
Metropolitan Toronto,  
this Court has consistently refrained from formulating internal limits to the scope of 
freedom of religion in cases where the constitutionality of a legislative scheme was 
raised; it rather opted to balance the competing rights under s. 1 of the Charter.134  
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Another early Canadian case, post-Charter, was R v. Jones.135  In this case, a 
pastor of a fundamentalist church refused to send his children to school (on religious 
grounds) and instructed them, himself, in a church basement.  He also refused to apply 
for an exemption through a mechanism available to him via government legislation. 
“Section 143(1) provides alternatives and allows for instruction at home or elsewhere, so 
long as that instruction is certified to be efficient.”136  He argued that the requirement that 
he send his children to the public school system “contravened his religious beliefs that 
God, rather than the Government, had the final authority over the education of his 
children, and deprived him of his liberty to educate his children as he pleased contrary to 
the principles of fundamental justice.”137  The Supreme Court determined that the 
legislation being challenged did not specifically prevent Jones from educating his 
children in the church school and therefore did not place an excessive or unreasonable 
burden on Jones and his students.  The majority thought that the provincial legislation 
offended Jones’ section 2(a) rights, whereas Wilson J. was not convinced of this, stating 
that “section 2(a) does not require the legislature to refrain from imposing any burdens on 
the practice of religion.  Legislative or administrative action whose effect on religion is 
trivial or insubstantial is not a breach of freedom of religion.”138  Justice Wilson’s view 
was a dissenting one in this case, and the jurisprudence since then has tended to err on the 
side of acknowledging a section 2(a) violation, then turning to a section 1 analysis to 
balance the competing societal rights.   	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 In Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys139, an orthodox Sikh 
schoolboy was not permitted to wear a kirpan (religious object that resembles a dagger) 
under his clothing because it apparently contravened school board rules about dangerous 
weapons at school.  The challenge was taken to the SCC and here it was decided that the 
decision to not allow the boy to wear the kirpan was an unreasonable infringement of his 
religious beliefs and rights.  Section 1 analysis did not support, what was confirmed to be, 
a section 2(a) violation. 
Freedom [of religion] is not absolute and can conflict with other constitutional 
rights.  Since the test governing limits on rights was developed in Oakes, the Court 
has never called into question the principle that rights are reconciled through the 
constitutional justification required by s. 1 of the Canadian Charter.140  
 
Assessment of freedom of religion cases, as heard by the Supreme Court, tells us that 
there is, so far, a relatively simple test to apply when gauging whether or not a particular 
religious belief (more correctly – the manifestation of that religious belief) should be 
constitutionally protected.  The belief simply has to be sincerely held, and sincerely acted 
upon.  The belief does not have to be supported by many other people, or form part of a 
dominant religious theology, in order for it to be accorded equal significance with any 
other belief of a religious nature that meets the above two requirements.   
 A more recent Supreme Court of Canada case moved slightly away from this 
approach, requiring definite proof of impedance of the ability to practice one’s religion in 
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order to show a violation of section 2(a).  S.L.v. the Commission scolaire des Chenes141 is 
a 2012 case in which parents challenged the government’s requirement that all 
elementary and secondary students in Quebec (whether public, private or home schooling 
students), beginning in 2008, must take the new Ethics and Religious Culture program 
(ERC).  This course was meant to replace all existing denominational religion and ethics 
courses previously being taught in the province.  The parents claimed that the program’s 
relativist approach to religion and ethics undermined their right to educate their children, 
with respect to religious beliefs, in the manner they felt was appropriate.  The Court 
responded by determining that the parents had not proven “harm” in terms of the 
application of this law and that the government’s goal in setting up this program 
overruled the parents’ rights to educate their children in a particular manner. 
 
Although the sincerity of a person’s belief that a religious practice must be 
observed is relevant to whether the person’s right to freedom of religion is at issue, 
an infringement of this right cannot be established without objective proof of an 
interference with the observance of that practice.142 
   
 
In this recent case, the Supreme Court bases its decision strictly on whether or not there 
has been proven interference with current observance of a religious practice 
(manifestation of religious belief).  Nonetheless, it reiterates (as identified in Syndicat) 
that the two relevant criteria necessary to prove a violation of section 2(a) of the Charter 
are that an individual must have a sincere belief in a particular religious tenet, and that 
the manifestation of that religious belief is being impeded or infringed by specific 
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legislation.   
 Religious belief and manifestation of that belief are, of course, intimately and 
necessarily connected.  Instructing students about other religions, and some of the beliefs 
held by those religions, has the potential to change the beliefs of the students taking the 
instruction.  This, in turn, may lead directly to interference with religious practice.  If you 
no longer believe that a particular religious practice is necessary, or required, then you 
are unlikely to continue to manifest the same behaviours previously considered 
“necessary”.  This is, presumably, what the parents in the S.L. case were worried about.  
The majority of the Supreme Court Justices managed to brush by these concerns without 
directly addressing them.  “L and J have not proven that the ERC Program infringed their 
freedom of religion, or consequently, that the school board’s refusal to exempt their 
children from the ERC course violated their constitutional right.”143   
 Justices Fish and LeBel, in their concurring remarks, allude to these concerns, 
saying that the Ethics and Religious Culture Program (“ERC”) that had been established 
in Quebec (at the time of the Court assessment) had a specific course outline associated 
with it, but that it was not well “fleshed out” in the documents supplied to the Court and 
that implementation of these teaching directives was left up to individual teachers who 
were administering the course.  “In its current form, the program says little about the 
actual content of the teaching and the approach that teachers will actually take in dealing 
with their students.”144  Justices Fish and LeBel state that, in the future, more information 
about the content of the course and about how that information is imparted to students, 
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may give individuals further ammunition to claim a section 2(a) violation.  “The state of 
the record, however, does not make it possible to conclude that the ERC Program and its 
implementation could not, in the future, possibly infringe the rights granted to L and J 
and persons in the same situation.”145   
 The non-nuanced approach taken in this case by the majority of the Supreme Court 
Justices has the potential to threaten religious doctrine and may make it more difficult for 
someone to challenge the requirement to learn about certain behaviours (including 
medical procedures) that are considered heretical by that individual’s particular religious 
group.  Following this line of thinking, for example, a medical student who argued that 
they did not want to work at a clinic where they had to sit and learn about abortion or 
contraception (even if they were not prescribing those activities themselves) would not be 
successful in legally challenging a requirement to complete this course because they 
would not be able to prove that the course interfered with their current ability to 
“practice” their religious beliefs.  A skeptic might be correct, however, in pointing out 
that attendance at such a clinic would have the possibility of changing the individual’s 
perspective (and possibly belief in particular religious ideology) and subsequently lead to 
a change in religious practice (although indirect and certainly theoretical).  
Two areas of controversy have emerged from analysis of these different cases 
dealing with religious tolerance.  Are all Charter rights to be read as equal, and how do 
we decide between two competing rights?146  “Logically, where there is not an apparent 
infringement of more than one fundamental right, no reconciliation is necessary at the 
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initial stage.”147  However, in situations where more than one right is in competition, “the 
Court has on numerous occasions stressed the advantages of reconciling competing rights 
by means of a s. 1 analysis.”148   
 A verdict in a recent Supreme Court of Canada case demonstrates the interplay 
between religious freedom and the realization of an important societal objective.  This 
recent case involved the request by the victim of a sexual assault to wear a niqab during 
the trial of the accused.149  The accused individuals objected to this, arguing that the 
niqab would interfere with the right to a fair trial and to the ability of the accused 
individuals to adequately cross-examine the witness (the victim).  Their concern was that 
the facial expression of the complainant would not be visible during cross-examination.  
The Ontario Court of Appeal reinforced the current perspective regarding claims of 
section 2(a) violation, pointing out that the witness need only prove that she believes that 
the practice of wearing the niqab is sincerely connected to her faith or spirituality, and 
that she is being prevented from wearing the niqab by requirements of the Court.   
 
If a witness establishes that wearing her niqab is a legitimate exercise of her 
religious freedoms, then the onus moves to the accused to show why the exercise 
of this constitutionally protected right would compromise his constitutionally 
protected right to make full answer and defence.150  
 
The Supreme Court delivered a nuanced and divided response to this question, consistent 
with the idea that request for differential treatment is not an all-or-none phenomenon and 
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that it requires a balanced assessment of competing rights and requirements.  Four of the 
seven justices thought that  
two sets of Charter rights are potentially engaged — the witness’s freedom of 
religion and the accused’s fair trial rights, including the right to make full answer 
and defence.  An extreme approach that would always require the witness to 
remove her niqab while testifying, or one that would never do so, is untenable.  
The answer lies in a just and proportionate balance between freedom of religion 
and trial fairness, based on the particular case before the court.151 
 
Two of the seven justices thought that wearing of the niqab would undermine the 
openness of the Canadian court system and that  
 
wearing a niqab in the courtroom does not facilitate acts of communication. 
 Rather, it shields the witness from interacting fully with the parties, their counsel, 
the judge and the jurors.  Wearing the niqab is also incompatible with the rights of 
the accused, the nature of the Canadian public adversarial trials, and with the 
constitutional values of openness and religious neutrality in contemporary 
democratic, but diverse, Canada.152  
 
One of the Supreme Court Justices (J. Abella) pointed out that a sexual assault victim 
who is pressing charges against her accused is already in a very vulnerable position and 
should not be forced to remove her niqab in order to testify.   
 
The harmful effects of requiring a witness to remove her niqab, with the result 
that she will likely not testify, bring charges in the first place, or, if she is the 
accused, be unable to testify in her own defence, is a significantly more harmful 
consequence than the accused not being able to see a witness’s whole face.  
Unless the witness’s face is directly relevant to the case, such as where her 
identity is in issue, she should not be required to remove her niqab.153 
 
 
This interesting case serves to point out the complicated to-and-fro that takes place in a 
situation where one is trying to balance competing rights and accommodate requests for 	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differential treatment.154  The solutions to these problems are seldom simple to negotiate. 
“The collision between rights must be approached on the contextual facts of actual 
conflicts.  The first question is whether the rights alleged to conflict can be 
reconciled.”155  If rights cannot be reconciled then some limits may need to be applied 
and a section 1 analysis will be carried out to confirm the need for such limitation.  In 
coming to a conclusion “the Court must proceed on the basis that the Charter does not 
create a hierarchy of rights”156 and the freedom to express religious or other beliefs “is 
restricted by the right of others to hold and to manifest beliefs and opinions of their own, 
and to be free from injury from the exercise of the freedom of religion of others.”157 
 
 
2.5.2 How Do the Boundaries, Established by Our Legal System and 
By Our Constitution, Act to Limit Freedom of Conscience? 
(Section 2(a)) 
 There has not yet been a Supreme Court of Canada case that deals specifically 
with freedom of conscience, unencumbered by religious ideology.  
While the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (“Charter”) s. 2(a) provides 
that “everyone has the right of freedom of conscience and religion”, the Supreme 
Court of Canada (“SCC”) has only ever heard cases that primarily engage freedom 
of religion. It has not yet heard a freedom of conscience case that does not also 
involve freedom of religion.158 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 David M. Brown, “Freedom from or Freedom for?: Religion as a Case Study in Defining the Content of 
Charter Rights” (2000) 33 U.B.C.L Rev. 551 [D.Brown] at 35. 
155 Trinity Western University v. British Columbia College of Teachers, 2001 SCC 31, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 772 
at para. 29. 
156 Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835, at p. 877. 
157 Ross v. New Brunswick School District No. 15 (1996), 133 D.L.R. (4th) 1 (S.C.C.) at para. 72. 
158 Linda McKay-Panos, “Freedom of Conscience:  What It Means for Canadians”, online: 
http://www.lawnow.org/d/sites/default/files/SR1364.pdf.  
	  	   54	  
It is difficult to be sure how strongly the Court would support individuals, or groups, who 
act against specific legislation, claiming to do so on the basis of freedom of conscience 
(not connected with underlying religious doctrine).  There have been lower court cases 
that have commented on this issue, as well as Supreme Court obiter dictum suggesting 
that freedom of conscience should be treated like freedom of religion (based as they are 
within the same Charter section).  “The purpose of s. 2(a) is to ensure that society does 
not interfere with profoundly personal beliefs that govern one's perception of oneself, 
humankind, nature, and, in some cases, a higher or different order of being.”159  This 
account of the section seems to suggest that there is no real need to differentiate between 
a strongly held religious belief, or a strongly held belief of conscience, both being 
personal beliefs that are integral to one’s identity and therefore worth protecting.   
In R. v. Morgentaler, Wilson J. attempts to differentiate between freedom of 
conscience and religion, particularly if these tenets are able to be adequately 
distinguished from each other.  This differentiation seems important because freedom of 
conscience can involve strong moral concerns that exist distinct from religious ideology, 
and therefore need to be judged on their own merits. 
It seems to me, therefore, that in a free and democratic society "freedom of 
conscience and religion" should be broadly construed to extend to 
conscientiously-held beliefs, whether grounded in religion or in a secular 
morality. Indeed, as a matter of statutory interpretation, "conscience" and 
"religion" should not be treated as tautologous if capable of independent, although 
related, meaning.160 
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In R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd, Chief Justice Dickson also seems to suggest that non-
religious beliefs should have the benefit of section 2(a) protection: 
The values that underlie our political and philosophic traditions demand that every 
individual be free to hold and to manifest whatever beliefs and  
 opinions his or her conscience dictates, provided inter alia only that such  
manifestations do not injure his or her neighbours or their parallel rights to hold and 
manifest beliefs and opinions of their own.161  
 
 
 It will be very interesting to observe a Supreme Court case that deals strictly with a 
section 2(a) challenge that is devoid of any religious connection.  How will the Court 
assess such a claim and will the Court think that manifestations of the right to freedom of 
conscience (or conscientious objection) are worthy of the same protection given to the 
practices associated with a particular religious ideology?   
It seems that freedom of conscience is broader than freedom of religion.  The 
latter relates more to religious views derived from established religious 
institutions, whereas the former is aimed at protecting views based on strongly 
held moral ideas of right and wrong, not necessarily founded on any organized 
religious principles.  These are serious matters of conscience.162 
 
In Ontario (Attorney General) v. Dieleman,163 the judge asked the question 
“is “action” motivated by conscience intended to be protected by the Charter in 
contrast to “protection against invasion” of a sphere of individual intellect and 
spirit such as protection against officially disciplined uniformity on orthodoxy?”  
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Will the courts be willing to protect manifestations of freedom of conscience – or only 
the right to believe what you want to believe (the inner workings of the mind – which are 
very difficult to control to begin with)?  Where will the lines be drawn if the right to act 
according to your conscience is permissible?  Theoretically, any legislation could be 
challenged by someone who: believed that the legislation was morally wrong; was legally 
obliged to obey the legislation; and, therefore argued that the legislation offended his or 
her freedom of conscience.  Presumably, as with freedom of religion, the boundaries of 
the right to challenge legislation under this section (relating to conscience) would be 
defined more completely through a section 1 analysis (once section 2(a) rights had been 
shown to have been violated). 
 
 
2.5.3 Where Does “Culture” Fit Into This Picture?  
It seems most reasonable to classify “freedom of culture” as a component of 
freedom of conscience, unless the culture-based belief and behaviour is intimately 
associated with an underlying religious belief or practice.  If this is the case, then the 
question of accommodation should be approached from a freedom of religion 
perspective.  Culture as a particular entitlement is dealt with more specifically in section 
27 of the Charter, which will be discussed briefly below. 
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2.5.4 Section 15 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
15(1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the 
equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in 
particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, 
religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.164 
 
The concept of equality for all was formalized in legislation in 1960 when the Bill 
of Rights165 was introduced.  This federal statute promised equality for all citizens under 
the law.   Described as “an Act for the Recognition and Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms”166, it was generally unsuccessful at providing real equality 
because it was, ultimately, a simple piece of legislation that did not supercede other 
legislation and/or constitutional doctrine, and could therefore be overruled or even 
overturned in particular circumstances.   
In 1982, the Charter was enacted as a new part of the Canadian constitution. The 
“purpose of s. 15 is to ensure equality in the formulation and application of the law.”167  
Section 15 of the Charter did not come into effect until 1985, three years after the rest of 
the Charter, in order that governments would have the time to bring their legislation in 
line with section 15 requirements.  Interpretation of section 15 has involved a number of 
changes over the years as the judiciary has struggled with how to ensure that the law 
applies equally to all citizens, consistent with the concept of substantive, rather than 
formal, equality.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 Charter, supra note 3. 
165 Canadian Bill of Rights, SC 1960, c. 44. 
166 Ibid. 
167 Joel Backan et al., Canadian Constitutional Law, 3d ed (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2003) at 1151. 
 
	  	   58	  
The first section 15 case to be heard by the Supreme Court of Canada was 
Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia 168 in 1989.  In Andrews, the Court 
confirmed the notion that laws should be assessed on the basis of substantive, rather than 
formal, equality and that implementation of “formal” equality actually had the potential 
to lead to increased distinctive and discriminatory legislative action.  The decision in 
Andrews introduced a two-step approach to the analysis of section 15.  As a first step, the 
court should determine whether an infringement of a guaranteed right has occurred.  
Secondly, if an infringement has occurred, the court must determine whether or not the 
infringement can be justified under section 1.  In Andrews, the Supreme Court identified 
that the term “discrimination” was critical to any section 15 analysis and that “grounds” 
of discrimination should be identified and tested to see if a violation has occurred.  The 
specific “grounds” of discrimination “reflect the most common and probably the most 
socially destructive and historically practiced bases of discrimination.”169  Enumerated 
grounds are those that are specifically noted in the definitional text of section 15.  “The 
grounds of discrimination enumerated in s. 15(1) are not exhaustive.  Grounds analogous to 
those enumerated are also covered.”170  What constitutes analogous grounds has developed 
gradually over the years through varying cases heard by the Supreme Court.  For example, 
writing for the majority in Corbiere v. Canada, Justices McLachlin and Bastarache stated 
that analogous grounds were those that 
often serve as the basis for stereotypical decisions made not on the basis of merit but on 
the basis of a personal characteristic that is immutable or changeable only at 	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unacceptable cost to personal identity.171  
 
 
An individual needs to identify that there has been a distinction with respect to his or her 
treatment based on an enumerated or analogous ground.  The individual must then show “not 
only that he or she is not receiving equal treatment before and under the law or that the law 
has a differential impact on him or her in the protection or benefit accorded by law but, in 
addition, must show that the legislative impact of the law is discriminatory.”172 
 
The two-pronged Andrews method of analyzing a potential section 15(1) violation was fairly 
consistently utilized by the courts until 1999. 
One of the most important cases in the development of section 15 jurisprudence 
has been that of Law v. Canada,173 in which a unanimous court described a more 
expansive method of section 15(1) analysis.  This broadened method of analysis 
contained three main components.   
A court that is called upon to determine a discrimination claim under s. 15(1) 
should make the following three broad inquiries: 
  
A.  Does the impugned law  
(a) draw a formal distinction between the claimant and others on the basis of one 
or more personal characteristics, or  
(b) fail to take into account the claimant’s already disadvantaged position within 
Canadian society resulting in substantively differential treatment between the 
claimant and others on the basis of one or more personal characteristics? 
  
 
B.  Is the claimant subject to differential treatment based on one or more 
enumerated and analogous grounds? 	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and 
  
C.  Does the differential treatment discriminate, by imposing a burden upon or 
withholding a benefit from the claimant in a manner which reflects the 
stereotypical application of presumed group or personal characteristics, or which 
otherwise has the effect of perpetuating or promoting the view that the individual 
is less capable or worthy of recognition or value as a human being or as a member 
of Canadian society, equally deserving of concern, respect, and consideration?174 
 
The Law analysis then further subdivided the second part of this analysis on the basis of 
contextual factors.  
The contextual factors which determine whether legislation has the effect of 
demeaning a claimant’s dignity must be construed and examined from the 
perspective of the claimant.  The focus of the inquiry is both subjective and 
objective.  The relevant point of view is that of the reasonable person, in 
circumstances similar to those of the claimant, who takes into account the 
contextual factors relevant to the claim.175 
 
This more detailed approach to section 15(1) analysis was prone to criticism that a 
more stringent analysis made the assessment increasingly formalized and had the 
potential to create a higher bar for complainants to overcome in order to prove a section 
15(1) violation.  Contextual factors identified by the Court in Law include the following: 
(A) Pre-existing disadvantage, stereotyping, prejudice, or vulnerability 
experienced by the individual or group at issue. 
(B) The correspondence, or lack thereof, between the ground or grounds on 
which the claim is based and the actual need, capacity, or 
circumstances of the claimant or others. 
(C) The ameliorative purpose or effects of the impugned law upon a more 
disadvantaged person or group in society. 	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(D) The nature and scope of the interest affected by the impugned law.176 
 
The decision in Law v. Canada placed an enlarged focus on the importance of the 
maintenance of human dignity.  Evidence of loss of human dignity, because of the effect 
of particular laws or legislative schemes, was felt to be critical in the assessment of 
whether or not a specific law violated section 15 of the Charter.  This more formalized 
approach, as well as the inclusion of “human dignity” as a focal point within the analysis, 
increased the difficulty encountered by a number of courts when assessing a claim under 
section 15.  “Human dignity” is a vague concept that is difficult to categorize and to 
measure.  Assessment of what constitutes a violation of human dignity is very subjective 
and difficult to reproduce from case to case. 
 In addition to the challenges introduced in Law v. Canada, the challenge of 
identifying appropriate comparator groups during section 15 analysis became more 
apparent and important in subsequent SCC cases.  “A misidentification of the proper 
comparator group at the outset can doom the outcome of the whole s. 15(1) analysis.”177  
A complainant has a right to suggest a comparator group to use in the section 15 analysis, 
but “while it is up to the claimant to make an initial choice of “the person, group, or 
groups with whom he or she wishes to be compared”, the correctness of that choice is a 
matter of law for the court to determine.”178 
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In 2008, in R v. Kapp179, the Court seemed to revert to an Andrews-type of 
analysis of section 15(1), requiring a two-part examination that focused on discrimination 
and substantive equality as key components of the assessment.  In this case, the Court 
also turned away from the requirement that a loss of human dignity play a large role in 
the establishment of a section 15 violation.   
At the end of the Law era, in Kapp the Supreme Court conceded that human dignity 
had indeed turned out to be an additional barrier to equality-seekers, adding another 
hurdle to what they had to prove.  Kapp marked the end of the use of human dignity 
in section 15 cases (although lower courts and lawyers were slow to appreciate that 
abandonment).180 
 
 
A number of lower court decisions that followed Kapp continued to use the four 
contextual components of section 15 analysis (from Law) in order to come to a 
conclusion regarding a possible Charter violation.  
Even though Withler181 and Hartling182 noted that the Supreme Court in Kapp had 
moved away from Law‘s insistence that discrimination be defined in terms of the 
impact of the law or program on human dignity, they still applied Law‘s four 
contextual factors, as did the court in Downey183.184 
In Kapp, the Court also moved section 15(2) to the forefront in terms of the 
particular stages of section 15 analysis.  Recognition of a section 15(2) rationale could 	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180 Jennifer Koshan and Jonnette Watson Hamilton,  “The Continual Reinvention of Section 15 of the 
Charter" (2013) 64 University of New Brunswick Law Journal 19 at 23. 
181 Withler v. Canada (Attorney General), 2008 BCCA 539 [Withler]. 
182 Hartling v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General), [2009] NSCA 130. 
183 Downey v. Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Appeals Tribunal), 2008 NSCA 65. 
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excuse section 15(1) from being addressed when assessing the claim of a section 15 
violation.  “If the government can demonstrate that an impugned program meets the 
criteria of s. 15(2), it may be unnecessary to conduct a s. 15(1) analysis at all.”185   
  In Ermineskin Indian Band and Nation v. Canada186(2009), the Supreme Court 
seemed to more definitively abandon Law, focusing instead on an Andrews-type of 
section 15 analysis.  
The phrase “human dignity” is never mentioned in Ermineskin. None of the four 
contextual factors from Law are used; rather context is now the larger social, 
political and legal context of the impugned legislation… the Ermineskin decision is 
therefore a strong signal to lower courts and tribunals that the Law framework for 
analyzing an equality challenge should no longer be used.187  
 
 
This perspective has been reiterated in a recent Supreme Court of Canada case dealing 
with common law relationships and spousal support and family property provisions.  As 
per Abella J., 
Kapp, and later Withler v. Canada (Attorney General), [2011] 1 S.C.R. 396, 
restated these principles as follows: (1) Does the law create a distinction based on 
an enumerated or analogous ground? (2) Does the distinction create a disadvantage 
by perpetuating prejudice or stereotyping?188 
 
 
 Despite the importance, reiterated in Hodge, of finding the relevant comparator 
group during section 15(1) analysis, the Court has, more recently, decided that the need 
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for a distinct comparator group is not absolute.  In Withler v. Canada189, a complex class 
action suit, it was difficult for the Court to identify a specific comparator group.  In this 
case, the Court decided that it was not always necessary to identify a specific comparator 
group and, instead, a court should identify if there is a distinction that has been made 
based on listed or analogous groups as outlined under section 15(1).  If a distinction can 
be identified, then the court should move on to the next stage of analysis rather than 
continuing to try to determine a comparator group.   
 In summary, when assessing a complaint of section 15 violation, courts currently 
will:  ensure that s. 15(2) doesn’t immediately come into play and de-legitimize a claim 
of discrimination via s. 15(1); and, start by considering the claimant’s point of view – 
objective and subjective perspectives – in order to ensure substantive rather than formal 
equality.  If a section 15(1) violation is confirmed by a court, the assessment then turns to 
a section 1 analysis to determine whether the violation can be demonstrably justified in a 
free and democratic society.  In terms of conscientious objection and application of a 
section 15 analysis, a complainant would need to identify that there is a distinction in 
their treatment, based on enumerated or analogous grounds, and then that this distinction 
resulted in discrimination.  Finally, the discrimination must not be demonstrably justified 
under section 1 of the Charter. 
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2.5.5   Section 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms  
7. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right 
not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental 
justice. 
 
 Section 7 tends to play a less central role in determining the right to freedom of 
religion, and to freedom of conscience.  In large part, this is due to the fact that these 
rights are already ostensibly protected under section 2(a) of the Charter.  In addition, it is 
considerably more difficult to determine where the boundaries of the right to life, liberty 
and security of the person lie in assessing freedom of religion and conscience cases.  
“The scope of s. 7…remains unsettled.”190  
The right to “Liberty” refers to the individual’s right to act without restraint and 
could therefore be relevant to a request for exemption from some particular educational 
activity.  It generally refers to “physical restraint” but has also been framed as referring to 
the ability of the individual to act autonomously, without restraint in terms of freedom of 
thought and manifestation of those thoughts or beliefs.  It may refer to the ability of an 
individual to make personal decisions that are not subject to specific limitation by the 
government or governmental bodies.  This line of argument was attempted in B. (R.) v. 
Children’s Aid Society191, but was rejected by the Court because it argued for family, 
rather than individual, rights to liberty of personal choice.  It is possible that this 
approach may be used in the future in an attempt to argue for freedom for the 
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manifestation of religious thought or the ability to pursue specific behaviour consistent 
with strongly held moral or ethical ideals. 
Security of the person is, once again, poorly defined, thus far, in Canadian 
jurisprudence.  In Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), McLachlin J. 
writes that 
decisions about one's body involve "security of the person" which s. 7 safeguards 
against state interference which is not in accordance with the principles of 
fundamental justice.  Security of the person has an element of personal autonomy, 
protecting the dignity and privacy of individuals with respect to decisions 
concerning their own body.  It is part of the persona and dignity of the human 
being that he or she have the autonomy to decide what is best for his or her 
body.192 
In Blencoe v. B.C. (Human Rights Commission)193, Justice Bastarache interprets security 
of the person, under section 7, to include psychological harm to the individual concerned.  
Section 7 was successfully used to challenge legislation in the R. v. Morgentaler 194 with 
a finding that Therapeutic Abortion Committees (established to determine a woman’s 
right to an abortion in the hospital setting) contravened a woman’s right to security of the 
person because they delayed implementation of the procedure and therefore had the 
potential to threaten a woman’s physical and mental health.   
In A.C. v. Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services)195 the Court accepts 
that legislation under the Manitoba Child and Family Services Act may have contravened 
some of the child’s section 7 rights, but determines that the violation does not function in 	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a manner that is contrary to the principles of fundamental justice. “The s. 7 liberty or 
autonomy right is not absolute, even for adults, nor does it trump all other values.  Limits 
on personal autonomy that advance a genuine state interest do not violate s. 7 if they are 
shown to be based on rational, rather than arbitrary grounds.”196  One can see where a 
claim of disruption of psychological integrity (due to inability to practice one’s religion, 
or follow strongly held moral or ethical beliefs), or a limit of one’s personal autonomy in 
relation to these matters, could be argued in an attempt to use the Charter to overrule 
legislation that impedes a individual’s freedom in these areas. 
 Assuming that a claimant is successful in arguing infringement of a section 7 right, 
he or she still may fail at the attempt to justify a manifestation of a particular belief if the 
deprivation of the section 7 right is demonstrated to be in accordance with the principles 
of fundamental justice.  Section 7 rights can be compromised if there are core values 
within the justice system that are thought to take precedence over those rights (for the 
greater good of society).  The principles of fundamental justice have been somewhat 
delineated in previous SCC cases and serve to provide a guide for establishment of a 
balance between rights of the individual, other rights guaranteed to individuals within 
society, and the overall benefit to society as a whole. “The principles of fundamental 
justice are to be found in the basic tenets and principles not only of our judicial process 
but also of the other components of our legal system.”197  This includes other legal rights 
guaranteed within the Charter.  Jurisprudential interpretation of the principles of 
fundamental justice are also informed by international instruments dealing with human 	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rights issues.   
 
The use of international instruments to aid in the interpretation of the meaning 
and scope of rights under the Charter, and in particular the rights protected under 
s. 7 and the principles of fundamental justice, is well-established in Canadian 
jurisprudence.198  
 
 
 Other descriptions of the principles of fundamental justice include the statement 
that 
it must be a legal principle about which there is sufficient societal consensus that it 
is fundamental to the way in which the legal system should fairly operate, and it 
must be identified with sufficient precision to yield a manageable standard against 
which to measure deprivations of life, liberty, or security of the person.199 
 
Arbitrariness is not tolerated when assessing laws with respect to the principles of 
fundamental justice.  “A deprivation of a right will be arbitrary, and will thus infringe s. 
7, if it bears no relation to, or is inconsistent with, the state interest that lies behind the 
legislation.”200  Another principle of fundamental justice is the tenet that laws should not 
vague.  They need to be able to be clearly interpreted so that the specific rule or offence 
can be adequately defined and understood by the general public.  Another important 
principle is the requirement that the means used to reach the objective that is outlined by 
the law or regulation be as minimal as necessary to reach the desired outcome.  “If the 
State, in pursuing a legitimate objective, uses means which are broader than is necessary to 
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accomplish that objective, the principles of fundamental justice will be violated because the 
individual's rights will have been limited for no reason.”201   
 Because of the difficulty defining the limits of section 7, and the fact that religion 
and conscience are already “protected” under section 2(a) of the Charter, the importance 
of section 7 of the Charter in protecting freedom of religion and conscience for anyone 
(including medical students) challenging specific legislation seems fairly limited.  
Although section 7 could, theoretically, be used to challenge a decision to refuse 
accommodation to a medical student, the likelihood of this is fairly low and therefore this 
section will not be discussed any further with respect to this thesis. 
 
2.5.6 Section 27 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
27. This Charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the 
preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians. 
  
Section 27 of the Charter reaffirms support for a multitude of different views 
within our society.  It confirms an ideology that is consistent with the themes of the 
Charter, as enacted in 1982.  It appears to support the philosophy inherent in the wording 
of section 2(a) of the Charter and argues against limitation of the scope of the rights 
contained therein.  “A more restrictive interpretation would be inconsistent with the Court's 
decision in R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd. and with the Court's obligation under s. 27 of the 
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Charter to preserve and enhance the multicultural heritage of Canadians.”202  This section is 
unlikely to be used to definitively support or negate a particular argument, as it can be 
used to argue for, or against, particular manifestations of belief, if they have the potential 
to infringe upon the right of other cultures to practice their beliefs. 
A limit on freedom of religion which recognizes the freedom of some members of the 
group but not of other members of the same group cannot be reasonable and justified 
in a free and democratic society...The Charter, when it protects group rights, protects 
the rights of all members of the group and not of just some members of the group 
because to do otherwise would introduce an invidious distinction into the group and 
sever the religious and cultural tie that binds them together. Section 27 of the 
Charter, which ties its interpretation to the preservation and enhancement of Canada's 
multicultural heritage, expressly precludes such an interpretation. 203 
 
 In the following chapter, I will attempt to determine what level and type of 
accommodation is reasonable in terms of individual religious, cultural or conscience 
requests for differential treatment within medical school training, taking into account the 
legal framework outlined here.  I will also identify how a challenge might be played out 
within a human rights tribunal, or in the courts, based on the current mechanisms of 
assessment of such claims – as described in this framework chapter.  
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CHAPTER 3:  APPLICATION OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
3.1 Introduction 
One of the main objectives of this thesis is to determine what level of 
accommodation is reasonable in terms of individual religious, cultural or conscience 
requests for differential treatment within medical school training.  In order to achieve this 
goal, the following chapter will attempt to determine: how to decide whether specific 
knowledge or skills must be acquired by a person who is training to become a physician; 
who determines what knowledge and skills are required for the graduating physician, and 
how that determination is reached; what role the concept of bona fide occupational 
requirement might play in determining whether certain knowledge or skills are 
mandatory within the medical education setting; whether there should be differential 
requirements between physicians and student physicians with respect to the ability to “opt 
out” of aspects of patient care; and, how students who are refused accommodation might 
challenge that decision (i.e. a complaint under human rights legislation or a Charter 
challenge).   
I will begin this chapter by discussing whether there is such a thing as a “generic 
physician”.  I will look at how medical school training is evaluated in Canada and 
whether or not there are specific criteria that must be met in order for students to graduate 
as fully trained medical doctors.  I will then give a brief comparison between the 
Canadian system and that found in the United States, but I will focus mainly on the 
Canadian system since it is much more consistent and reproducible from site to site.  I 
will discuss bona fide occupational requirement (BFOR) more extensively as it is a 
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necessary component of the analysis of a human rights claim of discrimination.  I will 
discuss whether or not accommodation should be applied equally between medical 
students who are training to become physicians and those licensed physicians practicing 
in a particular discipline.  Undue hardship will be addressed in terms of the ability of a 
program to accommodate requests for differential treatment. 
As the next phase in application of the legal framework, I will discuss the initial 
pathways that a student might follow in attempting to receive accommodation of requests 
for differential treatment.  These would likely involve direct requests to medical school 
administrators and university grievance bodies.  Initial assessment by college of medicine 
administrators would involve evaluating whether or not an educational or clinical 
experience was an “educational requirement” as determined by the school itself and, 
more particularly, by the accreditation body overseeing it.  The students might then move 
on to challenging a refusal to accommodate via human rights legislation or components 
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  Specific examples of possible student 
requests will be presented within this chapter in order to identify the possible outcomes of 
particular requests or complaints, and to outline the approach that might be used to 
challenge negative decisions. 
Finally, I will describe the importance of establishing a mechanism for dealing 
with accommodation requests that might occur within a medical school setting, and I will 
advance suggestions with respect to what might be included in such a policy document.     
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3.2 What is a physician and what knowledge/skills should a physician have? 
3.2.1 Is there such a thing as a generic physician? 
In trying to determine if certain educational and clinical experiences are 
mandatory within medical school training, it is necessary to establish what we mean 
when we say that someone has completed medical school training and is a medical school 
graduate, ready to move on to the next level of training.  Is there a certain body of 
knowledge that we expect all medical school graduates to have mastered?  Should all 
students be prepared to move into any area of training in any discipline that is a branch of 
medicine, or can we graduate students who are unprepared (either by way of the 
knowledge that they have acquired, or through lack of clinical readiness) to proceed with 
medical practice in particular areas?  Currently, medical schools across Canada are all 
accredited through the same process and all schools require similar curricula to be 
completed by their graduating students.  These graduates then move on to further training 
in residency programs in order to become qualified to practice medicine in one of a 
multitude of disciplines.      
 
3.3 Medical School Training in Canada 
3.3.1 Maintenance of Training Standards in Canada 
Training within each Canadian medical school is assessed at least every eight 
years by the Committee on Accreditation of Canadian Medical Schools (CACMS), a 
committee of the Association of Faculties of Medicine of Canada (AFMC).  The CACMS 
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works with the Liaison Committee on Medical Education (LCME)204 within the United 
States to ensure a good quality of medical education within Canadian medical schools.  
The CACMS and the LCME work together to develop and approve standards.205  Under 
“Accreditation Standards” on the LCME website the statement is made that:                                                                                                                                           
The accreditation process requires a medical education program to provide 
assurances that its graduates exhibit general professional competencies that are 
appropriate for entry to the next stage of their training and that serve as the 
foundation for lifelong learning and proficient medical care. While recognizing 
the existence and appropriateness of diverse institutional missions and educational 
objectives, the LCME subscribes to the proposition that local circumstances do 
not justify accreditation of a substandard program of medical education leading to 
the M.D. degree.206 
 
The accreditation process seems to be trying to ensure a general level of medical 
education that produces a generic physician, ready for entrance into post-graduate 
training in a number of different areas, and specific to none.  Consistency in the 
accreditation process is a central theme.  A medical school would presumably not meet 
accreditation requirements if it allowed individuals to excuse themselves from some 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
204 “The Liaison Committee on Medical Education (LCME) is the nationally recognized accrediting 
authority for medical education programs leading to the MD degree in the United States and Canada.	  The 
LCME is sponsored by the Association of American Medical Colleges and the American Medical 
Association.”, Liaison Committee on Medical Education, online: http://www.lcme.org/.   
205The U.S. Department of Education recognizes the Liaison Committee on Medical Education (LCME) for 
accreditation of programs of medical education leading to the M.D. degree in the United States. For 
Canadian medical education programs, the LCME engages in accreditation in collaboration with the 
Committee on Accreditation of Canadian Medical Schools (CACMS). The LCME is recognized as the 
reliable accreditation authority for M.D. programs by the nation's medical schools and their parent 
universities. It also is recognized for this purpose by the Congress in various health-related laws, and by 
state, provincial (Canada), and territorial medical licensing boards - from Recognition of the LCME as 
the accreditation authority for M.D. programs, online: http://www.lcme.org/overview.htm. 
206 “Functions and Structure of a Medical School:  LCME Accreditation Standards,” Liaison Committee on 
Medical Education (LCME),  online: http://www.lcme.org/standard.htm. 
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component of medical school training that was considered necessary by these 
accreditation bodies.  
The same accreditation process applies to medical schools in Canada and the 
United States.  Medical school training within Canada is fairly consistent from site to site.  
All Canadian medical schools are members of the AFMC and all Canadian medical 
schools must be LCME accredited.  Most U.S. states require their medical schools to be 
LCME accredited but this is not a universal policy across the United States.  All 
graduates of Canadian medical schools must pass the same licensing examination, the 
Licentiate of the Medical Council of Canada (LMCC), in order to practice medicine in 
Canada.  
The accreditation process serves to create consistency between medical schools 
across North America, and currently establishes a standard that is fairly uniform and may 
restrict different approaches to medical training engendered by requirements framed 
through religious or cultural lenses.  The accreditation standards could, theoretically, be 
challenged by individuals or groups that were anxious to modify an aspect of medical 
school training.  Licensing requirements could also be challenged, and alternate methods 
of establishing practice patterns for physicians could be developed if there was significant 
support within the medical community, and society in general, to do so.  For the purposes 
of this thesis, I will assume that current accreditation and licensing standards will apply 
and will, therefore, limit the ability of students to significantly modify medical school 
training to meet their own needs.  The main focus here will be on medical school policies 
and decisions taken within this established framework. 
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In terms of the the design of a medical school curriculum, and the ability of a 
particular school to modify its educational requirements to accommodate specific 
religious or conscience requests, it may be relevant to consider whether or not a medical 
school is privately or publicly funded.  There are no private medical schools in Canada; 
all are affiliated with a particular university.  The United States, in contrast, has many 
private medical schools. Privately funded medical schools, theoretically, have a greater 
ability to modify their teaching to acquiesce to certain requests from students or special 
interest groups.  This thesis will not consider private medical schools and the legal 
requirements for certain types of medical education within the United States as this 
differs with respect to the ability to practice medicine and obtain licensure from state to 
state within that country. 
Within Canada, all medical schools are affiliated with a university and with the 
provincial government of the province in which they are situated.  Medical schools within 
Canada receive much of their funding from provincial governments and this financial 
support means that provincial governments have some say over certain aspects of medical 
education (e.g. numbers of students, program funding).  This would likely not be a 
consideration within a medical school that is funded privately.  The close association that 
exists between Canadian medical schools and affiliated universities also gives students 
the opportunity to plead to the university administrative body to revisit decisions that are 
made by teachers and administrators within the medical school proper.  Discussion of 
accommodation of religious and conscience requests by medical students in this thesis 
will deal primarily with Canadian medical schools.  
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3.4 What is a Bona Fide Occupational Requirement and what role does it 
play in deciding about accommodation in conscientious objection 
requests?  
As discussed in chapter 2, bona fide occupational requirement (BFOR) is a term 
that applies in human rights law and refers to a work requirement that has been 
established, and is thought to be necessary in order for a job to be performed properly or 
efficiently.  Medical training prepares a student to become a practicing physician.  There 
are “occupational requirements” necessary for the practicing physician to obtain before 
the educational process is complete.  One could, therefore, argue that the mandatory 
components of medical education, as outlined by CACMS and the LMCE, are bona fide 
occupational requirements.  Alternatively, one would argue that the educational 
requirements for program completion, as outlined by these evaluating bodies, provide 
bona fide and reasonable justification for enforcing particular components of medical 
education.  
 The concept of a BFOR has the potential to play a very important role in 
determining whether or not medical students should be permitted to excuse themselves 
from some aspect of medical school training.  Are there “bona fide occupational 
requirements” for physicians?  Are there aspects of medical education and clinical 
exposure (in creation of the employable physician) that meet the BFOR criteria?  If so, 
then these components of medical education would need to be completed, regardless of 
the rationale given by those requesting exemptions.  If a component of the educational 
experience is not a BFOR, however, then perhaps a student could be excused from 
participating in this aspect of medical training. Current human rights legislation supports 
this concept.  The Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission (referring to the 
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Saskatchewan Human Rights Code207) states that unless a requirement is determined to be 
a BFOR, a workplace must accommodate workers up to the point of “undue 
hardship208”209  
As identified in Moore v. B.C.210, human rights legislation might be used to 
challenge a refusal to accommodate without referring specifically to occupational 
requirements.  Lack of access to education, even in a situation where there is a bona fide 
justification of a decision to exclude, can be challenged if meaningful attempts to 
accommodate have not been made.  This perspective supports the need to demonstrate 
“undue hardship” in terms of accommodation, even in situations where BFORs are 
identified.   
Medical training involves both educational (informational) and clinical 
components.  If it is possible for a student to become “educated” in a particular area, 
without directly experiencing the associated clinical exposure, then accommodation that 
excluded a specific clinical activity could, perhaps, be allowed and would still meet 
accreditation guidelines.  This would presumably be a judgment call based on assessment 
of the student’s request, success of the alternative educational experience, and importance 
of the educational or clinical component that was missed or modified.  The area of debate 
that could arise might not always be related specifically to the requirement that the 
student acquire a particular type of information, or skill, but would more often relate to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
207 The Saskatchewan Human Rights Code, SS 1979, c S-24.1. 
208 Canadian Human Rights Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. H-6), ss. 15(2),(3). 
209 “Bona Fide Occupational Requirement (BFOR)”, Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission, online: 
http://www.shrc.gov.sk.ca/pdfs/policies_guidelines/Bona-Fide-Occupational-Requirement.pdf . 
 
210 Moore v. British Columbia (Education), 2012 SCC 61, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 360. 
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whether or not this information or skill could be accessed in a way that was different 
from the norm.  For example, a student may not want to personally refer a patient for an 
abortion, or participate in performance of an abortion, but might still be willing to learn 
about the procedure, its indications and its complications.  It would be more difficult for 
the student to persevere with requests for exemption from activities that are held to be 
BFORs or educational requirements and likely integral to accreditation (e.g. touching the 
human body; giving a blood transfusion to a person with extensive blood loss), 
particularly in light of the formal system of medical school accreditation that is well 
established within Canada.  Lack of fulfillment of accreditation standards would likely 
meet the “undue hardship” descriptor in terms of proving inability to accommodate.  
Medical education is comprised of different types of learning.  Students learn about 
disease processes (book learning) but also learn to perform a number of clinical skills that 
range from interviewing a patient, to performing invasive procedures such as intravenous 
access and pelvic and rectal examination.  Medical students learn how to acquire 
information on the health, behaviours and beliefs of individual patients, without allowing 
these diverse practices and beliefs to interfere with the application of excellent health 
care delivery.  Many of the patients seen in medical practice may behave in ways that are 
anathema to maintenance of good health.  Nonetheless, the medical student must learn to 
advise and support patients in a non-judgmental and caring fashion in order to move them 
towards a state of improved overall health.  All of these components of medical training 
are integrated into the medical school educational experience and are overseen and 
evaluated by the accreditation system.  Requests for individual accommodation may be 
challenging to deal with in this educational environment. 
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3.5 Should medical students and practicing physicians be permitted 
similar levels of accommodation of religious or conscience requests?  
Should access to accommodation be more or less stringent in the medical school 
situation, in comparison to that afforded practicing physicians?  As discussed in Chapter 
1, the Canadian Medical Association Code of Ethics, (and other medical ethics codes 
established provincially) states the expectation that access to care will be facilitated by 
the physician, even if she or he is not willing to directly provide the care.211  No specific 
legislation has been established to allow physicians in Canada to choose to opt out of 
patient treatment in the emergency situation.  “Good Samaritan” – type acts, such as The 
Emergency Medical Aid Act 212 in Saskatchewan, prohibit prosecution of physicians who, 
in good faith, go to the aid of a patient in an emergency situation.   But there is no 
legislation in Canada, that I am aware of, that permits physicians, because of faith (or 
other conscience reasons) to excuse themselves from care of a patient in an emergency 
situation.  Physicians in Canada are expected to ensure that their patients can access the 
medical care they need, and are legally entitled to receive (including in a non-emergent 
situation), even if these physicians are unwilling to provide the care themselves.  In 
contrast to this, a significant body of legislation has been established in the United States 
to protect practicing physicians from legal sanction when they opt out of certain aspects 
of patient care (see chapter 1).213   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
211 Section 19, Code of Ethics:  Canadian Medical Association, online: http://policybase.cma.ca/dbtw-
wpd/PolicyPDF/PD04-06.pdf.  
212 The Emergency Medical Aid Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. E-8. 
213 The Coats Amendment; The Church Amendments. 
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Should medical students be treated in the same way as practicing physicians with 
respect to their ability (or inability) to excuse themselves from certain aspects of patient 
care?  These questions can be addressed from two distinctly different perspectives. 
Although medical students ultimately move on to become practicing physicians, the two 
groups have different roles and responsibilities and, therefore, it is reasonable that 
different rules might apply to medical students, than apply to physicians who are licensed 
to practice medicine.   
Medical students do not have final responsibility for patient care.  They are students, 
learning about the art and science of medical practice.  Medical school training was 
previously much more of an apprenticeship, in which a student followed a practicing 
physician on his or her work rounds, learning from that physician and gradually taking on 
more and more responsibility for patient care.  There has been increasing pressure, over 
the past twenty years, to reclassify medical students as “students” rather than “workers” 
and to make the educational component of medical education a priority, phasing out some 
of the service work previously delegated to medical students.  This transformation has 
been stimulated by concerns about the sleep deprivation that is experienced by medical 
students and residents during the training process, and the risk to patient care that may be 
associated with this sleeplessness.214 215216  Medical students have more ability to leave 
the hospital or clinic and go home when they are tired, abandoning care of patients to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
214 MJ Asken and DC Raham, “Resident performance and sleep deprivation: a review” (1983) 58(5) Journal 
of Medical Education 382. 
 
215 Matthew B. Weinger and Sonia Ancoli-Israel, “Sleep Deprivation and Clinical Performance” (2002) 
287(8) JAMA 955.  
 
216 Ilene M. Rosen et al., “Evolution of Sleep Quantity, Sleep Deprivation, Mood Disturbances, Empathy, 
and Burnout among Interns” (2006 81(1) Academic Medicine 82. 
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more legally responsible physician (resident or staff physician).  From the perspective of 
responsibility for care, and effect on patient wellness, withdrawal from an aspect of care 
by a medical student need not have any significant overall effect on patient well-being 
(barring perceptions of discrimination or unequal treatment that patients might have if 
they were aware of the students’ requests).  Viewed from this perspective, it appears that 
we can be more accommodating of students’ requests for differential treatment than we 
might be for physicians who bear total responsibility for their patients’ care. 
From another perspective, that of the medical student who is on a continuum from 
student to practicing physician, evading particular learning points or clinical experiences 
can, potentially, prove more troubling.  Presumably these teaching sessions and clinical 
rotations have been developed for a particular purpose and with a generic physician in 
mind.  This perspective is confirmed by reviewing LCME guidelines.  “The accreditation 
process requires a medical education program to provide assurances that its graduates 
exhibit general professional competencies that are appropriate for entry to the next stage 
of their training and that serve as the foundation for lifelong learning and proficient 
medical care.”217  If a medical student is allowed to opt out of certain facets of medical 
training for religious or conscience reasons, will this affect his or her ability to meet the 
LCME mandate to gain the professional competencies necessary to move on to the next 
stage of training and, ultimately, into medical practice?  An obvious example would 
involve a medical student who did not want to examine patients of the opposite sex.  
Learning the requisite anatomy would not deliver enough information and experience to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
217 “Functions and Structure of a Medical School:  LCME Accreditation Standards,” Liaison Committee on 
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permit the student to enter into a number of areas of post-medical school training.  A 
male student who was unwilling to examine a female patient would specifically not be 
able to train as an Obstetrician/Gynecologist.  He would not function adequately in an 
emergency department, intensive care unit, pathology department or operating theatre.  
He would not be able to resuscitate a baby in a delivery suite.  His ability to function as a 
resident in any of these post-graduate programs would be severely compromised and the 
degree of difficulty it would take to incorporate him into a system wherein he was 
permitted to refuse to treat female patients would, I believe, be insurmountable, unless 
the system itself was divided into clinics and hospitals where only patients of one sex or 
another were permitted to enter. 
Assuming that a college of medicine was willing to accommodate certain types of 
requests permitting students to be excused from involvement in some areas of medical 
training, concern persists with respect to the functional status of those students after 
graduation.  Once a student leaves the confines of the medical school and proceeds to the 
next stage of training, how can we ensure that accommodations given at the training stage 
will not disadvantage a future patient of this medical student?  These concerns suggest 
that accommodation within the medical school setting must still require that the medical 
student should have obtained the competencies required by accreditation bodies before 
being allowed to graduate with a medical degree.  This perspective is particularly relevant 
for direct patient exposures in which acquisition of necessary clinical and procedural 
skills may not be adequately achieved through simply reading about a procedure or 
process.  Familiarity with the signs and symptoms of disease processes, including 
physical examination findings related to these processes, is necessary for diagnosis of 
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such problems as miscarriage, sexually transmitted diseases and alcoholism.  Direct 
patient interaction is, in some circumstances, the only definite method of teaching 
students to be a complete physician, ready to take on the complex and intimate role of 
patient confidant and caregiver. 
3.6    Process for determining if a request for exemption should be accommodated
  
3.6.1 Does the request undermine a particular educational 
requirement and/or is the requirement a BFOR? 
 
Medical education includes both knowledge acquisition and attainment of clinical 
experience.  Enmeshed within this, and alluded to previously, is the fact that medical 
school training also teaches a student how to interact on a very personal level with 
another human being, in a manner that is extremely intimate, but at the same time, must 
be wholly professional.  This is the “art” of medical school training and is a theme that 
runs throughout the educational experience.  Development of these skills is critical to 
appropriate physician-patient interaction and must also be taken into consideration when 
contemplating any educational exemptions.  
In order to determine if the missed educational experience is mandatory for 
completion of training, the school may try to ascertain if the educational experience is a 
BFOR.  This determination would be made by identifying what medical knowledge and 
clinical experience the student is expected to have mastered by graduation time.  
Currently, in Canada, all students graduating from medical school are expected to have 
obtained the requisite knowledge and clinical exposure to allow them to move onto the 
next phase of their training (post-graduate programs).  One could certainly argue that a 
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decision to accommodate, which led to accreditation concerns, would create an undue 
hardship for the medical school concerned.  Determination that the educational 
experience is a BFOR would likely tie into accreditation requirements and therefore 
absolve the school of any legal need to accommodate the student’s request for differential 
treatment.  However, if the educational experience is not a BFOR, then human rights 
legislation generally would require that the medical school accommodate the student, if 
possible, to allow for claims of religious or conscience concerns that conflict with certain 
aspects of medical school training.  This duty would be limited by the actual ability of the 
medical school to respond to the student’s requests.  For the purpose of this thesis, and a 
human rights challenge, I will assume that, in the context of medical school accreditation, 
an educational requirement is, essentially, a BFOR. 
 
3.6.2 Would accommodation of the request impose undue hardship? (3rd 
arm of the Meiorin test) 
As has been previously identified, the duty to accommodate is limited by a claim of 
undue hardship by the group being asked to allow the accommodation.  
Undue hardship describes the limit on the duty to accommodate for employers, 
service providers and others covered by the Code.  Undue hardship can only be 
defined on a case-by-case basis as its determination relies on the specific facts of 
each case.  The point of undue hardship is only reached when the employer or 
service provider has done everything reasonably possible to accommodate a 
need.218  
 
In terms of medical school training, undue hardship might involve such particulars as: 
financial ability of the medical school to meet student requests; ability of the school’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
218 Bona Fide Occupational Requirement (BFOR), Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission, online:  
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other resources (instructors, patients, physical space) to be modified to meet student 
requests; impact on other medical students in the same college (increased work load and 
difficulty in coordinating experience in different areas of training); and, effect on the 
general goals and requirements of the educational process undertaken by the school in 
terms of the request advanced by the student. 
 
3.6.3   Refusal of Request for Accommodation – Challenge by Student   and 
Potential Mechanisms for Relief 
A student who is denied a request for accommodation would likely initially 
appeal within the medical school for reconsideration of the refusal.  The next level of 
appeal might be to the university with which the medical school is affiliated.  A human 
rights claim would likely focus on whether or not the student’s request undermined an 
educational requirement and/or caused undue hardship for the medical school.  Finally, a 
Charter challenge through the courts could be a route taken by a student intent on 
training to be a physician but troubled by questions of conscience or by religious 
ideology that conflicted with certain components of the curriculum. 
Three specific examples of possible student requests for accommodation have 
been chosen in order to demonstrate the mechanism that would likely be used by students 
to challenge a refusal of request for accommodation, and the analysis that would be used 
to determine the outcome.  These examples have been chosen because they are consistent 
with the kinds of requests that have been written about in the literature219 and are 
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therefore examples that may be encountered by medical schools in Canada currently and 
in the future. 
3.6.4 Examples of possible requests for accommodation 
 
Student A does not want to be involved with the arrangement or performance of an 
abortion during medical school training;  
Student B does not want to examine patients of the opposite sex (this request for 
accommodation might range from the request to never see or touch the naked body of a 
person of the opposite sex, to not being alone in the room with a person of the opposite 
sex);  
Student C wants to be excused from educational and clinical activities for certain periods 
of time in order to pray.   
3.6.5 Relief mechanisms within the medical school and university 
Individual medical schools and universities will have processes available for 
students to grieve a particular decision that is made with respect to their educational 
experience.  There appear to be very few medical schools that have specific policies 
developed to deal with conscience or religion-based student requests for exemption from 
educational or clinical experiences within medical school training.  Such requests may 
currently be dealt with through general anti-discrimination policies that have been 
established within the affiliated university.  Decisions like these are often made on a 
case-by-case basis and therefore may suffer from inconsistency and from the lack of any 
underlying unifying philosophy regarding medical education.   Nonetheless, a student 
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requesting an exemption would likely plead his or her case to the specific medical school 
and/or university site prior to proceeding with human rights or Charter challenges. 
 
3.6.6 Does the request undermine a particular educational requirement 
(BFOR)? 
 
Medical schools would likely assess requests for accommodation based on 
whether or not that accommodation would undermine a particular educational 
requirement and, therefore, threaten medical school accreditation.   
3.6.6(A) Student A is requesting to be excused from being involved in the 
performance of an abortion.  Access to abortion is a legal and accepted standard of 
medical care within Canada.  All medical students in Canada are taught about abortion as 
a component of their educational exposure to information pertaining to the discipline of 
Obstetrics and Gynecology.  The generic physician, graduating from a Canadian medical 
school, might possibly enter into Family Medicine, Emergency Medicine or Obstetrics 
and Gynecology residency training programs, all of which would require the student to 
function as a first line physician providing care to a patient requesting access to abortion, 
or suffering a complication of this procedure.  Although a graduating medical student 
would not be expected to know how to perform an abortion, he or she would be expected 
to know a significant amount about the procedure, potential indications for the procedure, 
and complications related to this procedure.  Therefore, knowledge about the procedure, 
rather than performance of the procedure, would be considered an educational 
requirement within Canadian medical schools. 
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3.6.6(B) Student B is requesting to be excused from ever examining a patient 
of the opposite sex.  Examination of individuals of both sexes is currently a component of 
the educational experience of students in medical schools across Canada.  As noted on 
the LCME website220, Educational Objectives ED-13221 and ED-15222 state the 
expectation that students within a medical school that is accredited by the LCME will be 
trained to become “generic physicians”, ready to move into any post-graduate program to 
which they might wish to apply.  These stipulations would require a student to be familiar 
with both the educational and the clinical components of caring for patients of both sexes.  
Although a medical student could learn about the anatomy and physiology of a patient of 
either gender from a textbook and other non-clinical instructional models, clinical 
experience is a necessary component of the educational process that would allow a 
student to move into a post-graduate position in any residency program.  Currently, it is 
an educational requirement for medical students training in Canada to obtain the 
necessary educational and clinical expertise to care for members of both sexes.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
220 FUNCTIONS AND STRUCTURE OF A MEDICAL SCHOOL: Standards for Accreditation of Medical 
Education Programs Leading to the M.D. Degree, online: http://www.lcme.org/functions.pdf. 
 
221 ED-13. The curriculum of a medical education program must cover all organ systems, and include the 
important aspects of preventive, acute, chronic, continuing, rehabilitative, and end-of-life care. 
222 ED-15. The curriculum of a medical education program must prepare students to enter any field of 
graduate medical education and include content and clinical experiences related to each phase of the human 
life cycle that will prepare students to recognize wellness, determinants of health, and opportunities for 
health promotion; recognize and interpret symptoms and signs of disease; develop differential diagnoses 
and treatment plans; and assist patients in addressing health-related issues involving all organ systems. It is 
expected that the curriculum will be guided by the contemporary content from and the clinical experiences 
associated with, among others, the disciplines and related subspecialties that have traditionally been titled 
family medicine, internal medicine, obstetrics and gynecology, pediatrics, preventive medicine, psychiatry, 
and surgery. 
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3.6.6(C) Student C wants to be excused from educational and clinical 
activities to pray (potentially up to five times per day).223  These prayer sessions will 
likely last between 5 and 10 minutes.  Student C and several other students within the 
medical school (with similar religious backgrounds) think that it would be a good idea to 
establish a place to pray for these students where they can go to pray away from their 
educational and clinical duties.  The first concern to address is whether or not it is 
feasible to acquiesce to this request for the student to be excused from educational and 
clinical duties a number of times per day on a regular basis.  Will this undermine a 
particular educational requirement?  As mentioned previously, medical students now tend 
to have more focus placed upon their educational experience, rather than filling an 
integral role in the network that cares for the patient population within a community 
setting or hospital environment.  If there is some flexibility with respect to the scheduling 
of prayer time periods, then it should be possible to accommodate this request without 
undermining the educational experience in any significant way.  If the student must pray 
at regular, specific times each day, this requirement may interfere more substantially with 
his or her duties and educational experiences.  It will also be more problematic if the 
student needs to go to a specific site to pray that is a significant distance away from 
where the educational experience is taking place.  Having a preordained site to pray may 
be a positive or a negative addition from this perspective, depending upon whether or not 
the identified site is in close proximity to the place where the student is training.  If no 
significant component of the educational experience is being missed by allowing these 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
223 The Basics of the Muslim’s Prayer, online: 
http://www.sunna.info/prayer/TheBasicsoftheMuslimsPrayer.php. 
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prayer times, then it would not be necessary to determine whether or not the time that is 
being missed undermines an educational requirement. 
 
3.6.7 Mechanisms Beyond Medical School and University 
Administration   
If student satisfaction is not achieved by grieving to the medical school or 
university, then a student might proceed with a human rights complaint or Charter 
challenge in an attempt to have his or her goals met.   
Education in Canada is a provincial responsibility and a medical student who is 
looking to human rights legislation to challenge a refusal to accommodate would likely 
deal with human rights legislation in the province where the medical school is located.  
As identified in the chapter 2, individuals would need to prove that there has been 
differential treatment, and that this differential treatment has led to prima facie 
discrimination, in order to proceed with a human rights claim when requesting 
accommodation within the medical school paradigm.  I will refer to the Saskatchewan 
Human Rights Code224 in discussing these various requests for accommodation.  The 
human rights codes across the country are similar and these steps can be translated to 
processes that would occur in other Canadian provinces.  The initial step in all of these 
instances would be to register a complaint of discrimination with the Saskatchewan 
Human Rights Commission [Commission].  The complaint process225 outlined in the 
Code describes mechanisms for proceeding with a complaint and the criteria that would 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
224 The Saskatchewan Human Rights Code, SS 1979, c S- 24.1 [Code]. 
225 Ibid., at s. 27(1). 
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establish the validity of such claims.  Once a complaint has been made, the Commission 
can proceed with management of the complaint or dismiss the complaint for a variety of 
reasons.226  Management of the complaint might include an attempt at resolution or 
settlement of the complaints, or a decision to proceed with further investigation of the 
complaint if there is a failure of mediation.227  Criteria for proceeding with a complaint 
analysis are found within the guidelines established for each provincial human rights 
commission.  Once a complaint has been accepted for investigation, the commission must 
determine if the discrimination is unavoidable, due to the particular circumstance, or 
deserving of sanction and/or punishment.  Integral to this discussion is the requirement 
for accommodation to the point of undue hardship. 
In the following section, I will address the specific legal mechanisms that 
Students A, B and C might use (human rights legislation and Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms) to challenge a refusal to accommodate.  I will describe these mechanisms 
for each student individually.  In each situation, the student will be trying to prove prima 
facie discrimination and will then claim relief for this discrimination through the legal 
mechanisms available to them via human rights legislation or the Charter.  As noted in 
chapter 2, in order to prove a Charter violation, the student must demonstrate that he or 
she has been subject to unequal treatment with respect to a prohibited ground and within 
a protected sphere of activity (section 15), and/or that there has been a violation of the 
individual’s freedom of religion or conscience (section 2(a)). 
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227 Ibid., at s. 28(1). 
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3.6.8 Applying Human Rights Legislation or Charter Rights to Refusal of 
Accommodation Requests 
3.6.8 (A) Student A:  
does not want to be involved with the arrangement or performance of an 
abortion during medical school training 
3.6.8(A)1 Human Rights Legislation: 
As with all areas of medical training, learning about abortion involves: knowledge 
acquisition; development of particular clinical skills; emotional and ethical understanding 
of this area of medical care; and, learning to directly interact with patients when 
providing care to them.  In order for a student to properly care for a patient who is 
requesting an abortion, or has suffered some complication related to this process, 
knowledge about this procedure is “integral to carrying out the requirements”228 of the 
role of the generic physician who is ready to enter into any post-graduate residency 
training program.  Actual performance of the procedure, on the other hand, is something 
that a physician would learn while in a post-graduate training program, and ability to 
perform this procedure at the medical student level is not a requirement of medical 
schools across Canada.  Interaction with patients who are requesting an abortion, or 
recovering from such a procedure, gives students insight (that they may not otherwise 
gain) into patients’ physical and emotional states while they are experiencing these 
processes.  Therefore, it is knowledge about the procedure and its complications, as well 
as an understanding of the lives of the individuals who present for such a procedure, 
rather than performance of the procedure itself, that would be considered either an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
228 “Bona Fide Occupational Requirement (BFOR)”, Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission, online: 
http://www.shrc.gov.sk.ca/pdfs/policies_guidelines/Bona-Fide-Occupational-Requirement.pdf . 
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educational requirement or a BFOR.  A medical student would not be expected or 
permitted to perform an abortion on a patient requesting or requiring such a procedure.  
Therefore, there is no argument to be made that acquisition of the skill of performing an 
abortion is a requirement within the Canadian medical school educational scenario.  
Because mastery of the procedural component of abortion management is not required for 
graduation from medical school, students could likely be accommodated in terms of 
excusing them from watching or being directly involved in performance of an abortion 
without compromising their medical education experience.  Matters become a bit more 
grey when one considers the patient interaction that could be missed when students are 
permitted to excuse themselves from interacting with patients who are involved in 
requesting such a procedure, or recovering from the procedure itself.  Allowing 
accommodation of this degree of withdrawal from patient interaction would be a 
judgment call and I believe that one could argue that some type of patient interaction in 
the above scenario is an educational necessity for the generic physician who will be 
practicing medicine independently in the near future. 
 
3.6.8(A)1.1 Undue Hardship   
It is unlikely to cause undue hardship to accommodate a student’s request not to 
be directly involved in the procedural component of an abortion. Acquisition of 
knowledge about abortion methods, without direct patient interaction, could be achieved 
fairly easily, in consultation with a teacher within the medical school. The request might 
necessitate a change in scheduling for the student and oversight will be required to ensure 
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that appropriate knowledge is gained through the process of self-study.  Undue hardship 
could possibly be claimed in a situation where the presence of a student in the operating 
room to help with performance of an abortion was necessary in order for the operation to 
proceed.  This is unlikely and, as noted previously, the use of medical students as 
“worker bees” on the wards, rather than students who are observing the treatment 
process, is no longer encouraged by the Canadian medical school training system.   
3.6.8(A)2 Charter challenge 
Assuming that Student A was not successful in applying human rights legislation to 
force accommodation of the request to be excused from involvement with any patients 
requesting an abortion, or having one performed, the student could then move on to the 
courts and attempt to use the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to force the 
medical school to allow him or her to be excused from this component of the medical 
school curriculum.  The sections of the Charter that would be most useful in advancing 
this challenge would be section 2(a) and section 15.  Section 1 would then play the 
important role of potentially allowing for infringement of religious freedom, or for 
permitting differential treatment, in situations where discrimination has occurred but is 
judged to be necessary or reasonable.  Assuming that a medical school, as part of a 
university, would be subject to the Charter (see discussion on this point in chapter 2), 
section 2(a) is the section that would most likely be used to challenge a decision not to 
accommodate a religious or conscience-based request for differential treatment. 
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 3.6.8(A)2.1  Section 2(a)  
In order to prove a section 2(a) violation, the individual making the request to be 
excused from involvement in anything to do with an abortion could argue that his or her 
religious or conscience beliefs prevented involvement in this process.  The belief about 
the “wrongness” of abortion would need to be shown to be a belief that was sincerely 
held by the individual concerned.  The individual would then need to be able to show that 
the belief created an obligation on the part of the individual to avoid being involved in 
carrying out an abortion.229  The amount of involvement in a process, such as abortion, 
that a student might be willing to accept would depend upon the individual’s 
interpretation of the tenets of his or her religion.  This could vary significantly, consistent 
with the wide range of beliefs and uneven adherence, with respect to standard teachings, 
between individual members of a religious group.230  Once a violation of section 2(a) had 
been proven, the medical school/university would then be required to show that the 
violation was justified via a section 1 analysis.  Failure to do this would require 
implementation of the student’s request for accommodation.   
As outlined in chapter 2, a section 1 analysis that permits a Charter violation to be 
upheld (justification component) requires that the limitation applied to the individual is 
based on an objective that is shown to be important enough to warrant undermining a 
right that would otherwise be available to the person under the Charter.  The objective 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
229 Multani, supra note 125. 
230 Roni Caryn Rabin, “Respecting Muslim Patients’ Needs”, November 1st, 2010, The New York Times, 
online:  http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/01/health/01patients.html?_r=0. 
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must be “pressing and substantial”231 and if those requirements are met, then the means 
used to obtain the objective (resulting in limitation of the individual’s rights) must be 
shown to be “reasonable and demonstrably justified.”232  Assessment of the means 
involves a proportionality test that is comprised of three components: the means must be 
rationally connected to the objective (they must not be arbitrary or unfair); there must be 
minimal impairment of rights; and there must be proportionality between the 
infringement and the objective. 
In a case such as this, one would want to divide the request for accommodation into 
an assessment that involves the knowledge acquisition component of the process (what is 
an abortion, how is it performed, what are the complications that might be associated 
with such a process?) versus the procedural component of performing an abortion.  Since 
the ability to perform an abortion is not a usual requirement of a student graduating from 
medical school, it is extremely unlikely that a requirement that a student actually 
participate in the procedure would be held to be necessary.  In this instance, therefore, the 
objective (knowing how to perform an abortion) would not meet the requirement of 
being sufficiently important to warrant limiting the individual’s rights.  On the other 
hand, it is very likely that the requirement that the student learn about the procedure, the 
reasons for it and any associated complications, would be upheld and the student would 
be required to proceed with this component of his or her education or not complete the 
training to become a physician.  Assuming, once again, that we are training a generic 
physician who is ready to enter into any residency training program, and may encounter a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
231 R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103. 
232 Ibid. 
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patient who wants to have an abortion performed (or has recently had this process 
completed), an understanding of the procedure and its complications would be required 
knowledge for a newly graduated physician.  A physician is expected to safeguard the 
health and rights of patients under his or her care.  Patients have the right to make 
decisions about their own health care.233  In order to do so, they need to be properly 
educated about their medical condition and about the possible medically acceptable and 
legal options for treatment.  Only a physician who is properly educated about the options 
for management of a pregnant patient (including a patient who does not want to be 
pregnant) can provide the appropriate level of care. 
 Further discussion would likely center around the means by which the student 
might acquire information about an abortion and its complications.  The three subsets of a 
proportionality assessment would be explored to be certain that: there was a rational 
connection between the means of acquiring the educational objective and the educational 
outcome; that the student’s rights were minimally impaired so as to limit hardship for the 
individual in terms of his or her religious or conscience concerns; and, that there was 
appropriate proportionality between infringement of the student’s rights and the objective 
of teaching the student about abortion.  Infringement of the student’s right to practice 
conscience or religious beliefs (in this case, the request not be involved in an abortion in 
any way) must be balanced against the objective of ensuring that the student is 
appropriately educated such that he or she can competently care for the pregnant patient.  
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(This very well may include the ability of the student to interact with and respond to the 
needs of the patient requesting an abortion).   
A student who was opposed to abortion might be willing to learn about the 
procedure, but might object to doing so in a situation in which it was necessary to 
actually observe an abortion, or might object to being responsible for facilitating an 
abortion (referring the patient to someone who would perform the abortion, or counseling 
a patient about the possibility of having an abortion).  In a case scenario such as abortion, 
careful balance between the specific, necessary objective and a minimal impairment of 
rights must be negotiated in order to provide balance and fairness to students entering the 
medical school environment.  Management of this ethical dilemma must also take into 
consideration the expectation in Canada that a patient has a right to have access to 
appropriate and legally available medical care, even if the individual physician does not 
want (personally) to provide that care. 
 3.6.8(A)2.2    Section 15 
 This same student might use section 15 of the Charter to challenge a refusal to 
accommodate a request not to be involved with any patients requesting an abortion, or 
having an abortion performed.  As a first step, a court would determine whether an 
infringement of a guaranteed right had occurred.  The court would accomplish this by 
identifying if a distinction had been made based on enumerated or analogous grounds as 
set out under section 15(1).  If a distinction is identified, then the court would need to 
determine if the purpose or effect of this differential treatment was discriminatory.  
Identification of discrimination would then lead the court to a section 1 analysis to 
	  	   100	  
determine if this distinction could be upheld as being demonstrably justified.  In this 
particular circumstance, a student might attempt to claim discrimination based on a 
prohibited ground or analogous ground (religion and/or culture might be possibilities). 
 It may be relatively straightforward for the student to show that involvement with 
performance of an abortion would directly conflict with the student’s ability to practice 
his or her religion or maintain a functioning association with a particular culture.  The 
individual might argue that these beliefs should be respected and that the requirements set 
forth by the medical school conflicted with these beliefs and therefore interfered with the 
ability of the student to belong to (or function within) a particular community and still 
complete medical school training.  The effect of the requirement to be involved in an 
abortion (based on the fact that the student might be unable to adhere to this requirement 
and also practice the tenets of his or her religion or cultural community) would be 
discriminatory (with religion as the enumerated ground resulting in the distinction that 
undermined the student’s ability to participate).  It would be more difficult to show that 
learning about an abortion, and its associated complications, would interfere with the 
ability of a student to maintain his or her beliefs and stay true to the doctrines of the 
religion or cultural community.   
Although the sincerity of a person’s belief that a religious practice must be 
observed is relevant to whether the person’s right to freedom of religion is at issue, 
an infringement of this right cannot be established without objective proof of an 
interference with the observance of that practice.234 
  
 Assuming that the student could prove a section 15 violation in this particular 
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circumstance, the court would then move on to a section 1 analysis to see if the Charter 
violation should be upheld.  As noted above, assuming that we accept the concept of a 
generic physician who is meeting accreditation requirements and is expected to have a 
certain body of knowledge and clinical experience in order to proceed to the next level of 
training, it is likely that a section 1 analysis would find that, at least, gaining knowledge 
about abortion and its potential indications/complications would pass the “pressing and 
substantial” objective test as the first part of the section 1 evaluation.  What the student 
would be required to do, in order to gain the requisite knowledge, would need to be 
assessed in terms of a level of proportionality that would balance the individual’s 
religious beliefs against the requirements laid out by the medical school.  Is the objective 
(learning about or performing an abortion) rationally connected to the educational 
requirement as mandated by accreditation bodies?  Is there minimal impairment of the 
student’s rights?  Is there proportionality between the infringement (challenging the 
individual’s rights to practice his or her religious beliefs) and the objective (becoming an 
appropriately knowledgeable and skillful physician)?  
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3.6.8(B) Student B: 
does not want to examine patients of the opposite sex (this request for 
accommodation might range from the request to never see or touch the 
naked body of a person of the opposite sex, to not being alone in the room 
with a person of the opposite sex) 
 
 
 3.6.8(B)1 Human Rights Legislation 
  As identified previously, it is currently required that students who are graduating 
from accredited medical schools in Canada learn to care for patients of both sexes.  This 
is a bona fide educational requirement, and one that cannot be modified within our 
system that deals with patients of both sexes in acute and chronic care settings.   The 
school would, therefore, not legally need to accept the student’s wish to excuse him or 
herself from examining patients of the opposite sex. 
 3.6.8(B)1.1 Undue Hardship 
Designing a program that would allow student B to excuse him or herself from 
ever examining someone of the opposite sex would definitely create undue hardship for 
the medical school and for the community to accommodate.  Specific training would need 
to be organized for this individual student, identifying patients of only one gender who 
would be available for this student to treat and examine.  It would be very difficult to 
ensure that the student was never placed in a position where he or she might need to 
provide treatment to a patient of the opposite sex in an emergency situation.  Such a 
scenario could potentially prove unsafe for the patient who needed to be treated 
emergently, either because the student refused to treat the opposite-sex patient, or treated 
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the patient in a substandard fashion because of lack of familiarity with the care of the 
patient, or discomfort in dealing with a patient of the opposite sex when the student had 
not developed the skills to do so in a professional manner. 
 
3.6.8(B)2  Charter challenge 
3.6.8(B)2.1 Section 2(a) 
An individual making a request to never examine someone of the opposite sex 
could argue that religious or conscience beliefs prevented him or her from engaging in 
this process.  The religious or conscience belief would need to be shown to be a belief 
that was sincerely held by the individual concerned.  The individual would then need to 
be able to show that the belief created an obligation on the part of the individual to avoid 
being in a situation where it might be necessary to see or touch the unclothed body of a 
member of the opposite sex.  As with most other challenges that have gone before the 
courts using section 2(a) as a method of arguing for differential treatment, it is likely that 
the individual would be able to demonstrate a section 2(a) violation, and it would then 
fall to section 1 to determine whether or not this violation should be allowed. 
Section 1 analysis would assess the request in terms of whether or not the 
limitation on the student’s rights was demonstrably justified (pressing and substantial 
objective) and whether there was proportionality between the limitation of rights and the 
objective of the limitation.  The objective of learning to examine and treat patients of 
both sexes, as a graduating physician, is supported by the medical school accreditation 
system and by our practice of medicine in Canada and the western world.  This objective 
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meets the “pressing and substantial” benchmark.  A proportionality assessment would 
determine if the means (teaching students about anatomy, physiology and examination 
skills for patients of both sexes) were rationally connected to the objective of educating 
students with respect to the medical care of patients of both sexes.  The next step would 
involve ensuring that there was minimal impairment of the student’s rights while 
ensuring the requisite objective.  Finally, it would need to be demonstrated that there was 
proportionality between infringement of rights and the objective.  As noted above, 
acquisition of skills in examining someone of the opposite sex is a process that is 
multifaceted and involves more than just an anatomic understanding of the opposite-sex 
patient.   
A generic physician, unleashed upon the general public, must currently be able to 
deal appropriately with patients of both sexes.  Application of the minimal impairment 
component of the Oakes test would demonstrate that the rights of the individual, who is 
required to learn about and examine patients of the opposite sex, are as minimally 
impaired as is possible in this particular scenario.  The minimal impairment test would 
not require that request for exemption from the requirement to examine someone of the 
opposite sex be permitted, since this component of medical education is integral to the 
training and practice of medicine in Canada (bona fide educational requirement).  It is 
difficult to contemplate permitting a student to learn only so much about examination 
(including body contact) of someone of the opposite sex when requirement for complete 
care is the goal.  It is likely that a section 1 analysis would support a limitation of the 
right in this circumstance, and that the student would be required to proceed with learning 
about the care of members of the opposite sex. 
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3.6.8(B)2.2 Section 15 
In this circumstance, the individual claiming a section 15 violation would need to 
demonstrate that he or she was being discriminated against based on a listed or analogous 
ground (possibly religion or culture) and that his or her beliefs did not allow visualization 
or examination of the body of someone of the opposite sex.  Inability to complete medical 
school without caring for and examining members of the opposite sex would impede the 
student from reaching the goal of becoming a physician through training in the Canadian 
medical system.  The individual’s membership in a particular group that prevented these 
type of examinations would provide the requisite distinction needed to begin the process 
of claiming a section 15 violation.  Inability to graduate from medical school because of 
membership in a religious or cultural group could be claimed to result in discrimination 
against that individual (effect of the distinction) and confirm a section 15 violation.   
A section 1 analysis would then be carried out to determine if this violation 
should be upheld.  As identified previously, our current system requires that all medical 
school graduates acquire a certain level of knowledge and clinical experience that would 
allow them to proceed on to a wide variety of post-graduate training options.  This 
generic physician would, currently, need to be able to examine members of both sexes.  
Only a major change in our society, such as creating clinics and hospitals that look after 
only men or only women, would allow medical students to opt out of learning about the 
examination of patients of both sexes.  A section 1 analysis would find that a requirement 
to learn about and care for members of both sexes is a requirement in the Canadian 
medical training system (pressing and substantial), and that this section 15 violation is 
warranted.   
	  	   106	  
3.6.8(C) Student C: 
wants to be excused from educational and clinical activities for certain 
periods of time in order to pray. 
 
 3.6.8(C)1 Human Rights Legislation 
  As long as student C is not having to miss a critical educational component of 
medical school curriculum on a regular basis, then he or she should be able to be excused 
from medical school for short periods of time in order to take part in these prayer 
sessions.  In the event that the request for prayer time includes considerable time for 
travel to and from a prayer site, or in the circumstance where the prayer must take place 
at a certain time or times of the day, accommodation may be significantly more difficult 
to facilitate.  In these cases, it may be very difficult for a student to achieve a specific 
educational requirement.  Attempts at accommodation could be made, but ability to do so 
would depend upon the concept of undue hardship and whether or not such options for 
accommodation were possible. 
 3.6.8(C)1.1 Undue Hardship 
 It is unlikely that it would create undue hardship for a medical school to 
accommodate a student’s wish to be excused to pray for short periods of time, a number 
of times per day, during medical school training.  This accommodation may be more 
difficult in a residency program where the resident is expected to play a larger role in 
caring for the patient and would be participating in various processes and procedures that 
may not break at the times needed for the individual who was hoping to be excused to 
pray.  Undue hardship may be encountered if it is necessary to establish a permanent 
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prayer site and to allow medical students to access this site several times a day – 
especially if they are away at other educational centers.  As noted above, requirement for 
specific, unchanging prayer times may also be extremely difficult to accommodate within 
a medical education framework in which patient care is not necessarily taking place 
within usual work hours.   
3.6.8(C)2 Charter challenge 
3.6.8(C)2.1 Section 2(a)  
 A student who is refused the right to pray several times per day as a part of his or 
her religious beliefs might also claim a section 2(a) violation in an attempt to push for 
accommodation.  The need to engage in these prayer sessions could be shown to be a 
strongly held belief, integral to the practice of this individual’s religion.  As such, refusal 
to accommodate would likely be shown to be a section 2(a) violation.  Section 1 analysis 
would look at the request that was being made and the circumstances surrounding the 
need to attend these prayer sessions.   
The pressing and substantial objective of ensuring acquisition of an educational 
requirement has the potential to be undermined by excessive time away from the 
educational setting.  If the prayer times were flexible and short, and the prayer site was 
close to the individual’s education and clinical exposure sites, then accommodation of 
such a request would likely require little work on the part of the medical school involved 
and would result in minimal diminution of the educational and clinical exposure on the 
part of the student.  In this case, a section 1 analysis would likely find that the Charter 
violation could not be upheld and that the student’s requests should be accommodated.  
	  	   108	  
The proportionality component of a section 1 analysis would need to demonstrate a 
rational connection between the means of the achieving the particular educational 
requirement and the educational objective itself.  These means must not be arbitrary or 
unfair.  For example, a student may be able to learn about a particular clinical situation by 
reading about it, or watching videos, rather than being at the bedside at all times.  The 
option to learn in different ways that might better accommodate the student’s requests 
would need to be considered.  The assessment would look at whether there was minimal 
impairment of the individual’s rights in the effort to ensure that the academic mandate 
was achieved. For example, although it might be necessary to limit the individual’s right 
to be away from the educational process for certain times during the day (or certain 
events) a total ban on taking a break from clinical experience would likely not be 
necessary or reasonable.   This more specific assessment of how much of a limitation is 
really necessary speaks to the “minimal impairment” component of the proportionality 
assessment.  Finally, there must be proportionality between the infringement (the degree 
that the individual’s rights are compromised) and the objective of attaining a particular 
quality and quantity of educational experience.  Are the individual’s rights compromised 
more than is actually necessary in order to achieve the desired objective? 
3.6.8(C)2.2 Section 15 
Sections 15 may also be used to challenge a decision or policy that medical 
students not be excused from educational and clinical duties in order to pray one or 
multiple times per day.  A student would claim discrimination based on enumerated or 
analogous grounds (likely religion) and would argue that his or her religion required daily 
prayer as an important component of religious practice.  A section 15 violation would be 
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shown by demonstrating that the demands of the distinction associated with the student 
(religious belief, cultural requirements) resulted in differential treatment that was 
discriminatory in that it did not allow the student equal access to education and 
employment (training as a physician).   
A section 1 analysis would then assess whether or not the objective (learning the 
components of medical education that would be missed by accommodating the student’s 
wishes) was pressing and substantial enough to support refusing the request.  A 
proportionality assessment would then be carried out to determine if the means used to 
ensure that the objective was met did not unduly impair the rights of the individual 
making the section 15 claim.  Perhaps some middle ground could be arrived at wherein 
the student would attend some prayer sessions, but not others, or another prayer site could 
be set up closer to sites of educational or clinical training so that student prayer could be 
facilitated. Minimal impairment of the individual’s right to be involved in his or her usual 
activity, while still learning the requisite information, must be established.  
Proportionality between the amount of infringement experienced and the importance of 
the goal would finally need to be demonstrated to ensure that the goal of educating the 
student in the particular area of concern did not blind administrators or instructors to the 
opportunity for accommodation that may be identified if alternative options were more 
readily embraced. 
 
In summary, these three case examples serve to identify the conflicts (and potential 
resolutions) that may occur when individuals with certain religious or cultural beliefs and 
practices, different from the established Eurocentric perspective, enter medical school in 
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Canada and other western countries.  Refusal to accommodate may result in a challenge 
to this decision by the student involved.  These challenges would likely be brought to the 
medical school and the university with which the medical school was affiliated.  If 
resolution did not occur at this stage, the student might go on to challenge a decision or 
policy via human rights legislation or the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  
Human Rights assessment would involve a Meiorin-type evaluation to determine if there 
was a bona fide educational requirement or BFOR involved that required the student to 
meet the educational mandate as determined by the medical school involved.  An 
evaluation of undue hardship would then be carried out to see if accommodation of the 
individual’s requests was possible. 
Charter challenge would most likely focus on sections 2(a) and 15 in an attempt to 
prove that a particular medical school policy or educational requirement violated an 
individual’s rights.  If a violation could be demonstrated, then section 1 analysis would 
assess whether or not the violation could be upheld.  Ultimately, the proportionality 
assessment carried out through a section 1 analysis is the most important, and most 
interesting, component of this process.  Some degree of accommodation will usually be 
possible and the section 1 analysis will then tend to look most specifically to the minimal 
impairment component of the assessment in an attempt to limit the damage to individual 
rights and autonomy as much as possible.  Minimal impairment certainly applies in the 
case of abortion, where the right of the student not to be involved directly in the 
performance of an abortion must be balanced against the need for the student to 
understand the procedure, its process and complications.  The student should be able to 
remove him or herself from the actual procedure (although this may not be possible for a 
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physician training in another area of medical training- such as obstetrics and gynecology- 
depending upon the mandate of the particular residency training program) but would not 
be allowed to completely avoid this portion of educational training towards becoming the 
“generic” physician.   
Minimal impairment is also an important concept when determining how one might 
accommodate prayer within a medical school educational environment.  Some amount of 
educational exposure could likely be “missed”, or accessed in an alternative form, such 
that the individual would be able to excuse him or herself from a scheduled educational 
experience in order to attend prayer.  This accommodation would require that a balance 
be established between time spent away from school and the acquisition of necessary 
educational information and experience.  Excessive time away would likely not be 
possible or acceptable. 
Finally, minimal impairment assessment, in the case of the request to not examine 
someone of the opposite sex as a component of medical school education, would come to 
the conclusion that no alternative approach is possible other than a definitive requirement 
for the student to learn to examine and interact with patients of both sexes.  In our 
western medical training experience and practice situation, the student must be wholly 
familiar with the anatomy, physiology and clinical methods of examining someone of the 
opposite sex (as with someone of the same sex as the examiner).  Physical examination is 
an intimate exercise that must be practiced by the physician student in order that he or she 
is ready to engage in this process competently and appropriately once medical school 
training is completed.  There really is no way to allow for some degree of lessened 
contact and still acquire the skills that are necessary for competent patient care.  If a 
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student felt that a request for this type of accommodation was non-negotiable, then his or 
her admittance to medical school in Canada would not be reasonable or possible.  
3.7 Importance of Establishing A Protocol for Managing these Requests at a 
Medical School 
As noted previously, requests for accommodation may become more frequent over 
time as we experience an alteration in our population mix from a religious and cultural 
perspective (due to such things as a changes in immigration patterns and entry of more 
Aboriginal students into medical school).  Decisions to allow for accommodation are 
complex and sometimes controversial.  Discussions may be emotional and difficult to 
resolve since they often arise in association with deeply held beliefs and ideals that are 
not easily abandoned by the students involved, and may be poorly understood by teachers 
and administrators in a college of medicine.  Establishment of a protocol for dealing with 
these issues would enhance the transparency of the decision-making, allow for 
consistency from one request to another and, hopefully, limit the conflict that will arise 
between teachers/administrators and the students they are trying to educate. 
 
3.8     Examples of Medical Schools with Conscientious Objection Request 
Mechanisms 
Many universities have developed policies to deal with accommodation requests 
by students for claims of physical or intellectual disability.235 236 Very few medical 
schools have developed accommodation policies that are specific to the study of medicine 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
235“Academic Accommodation and Access for Students with Disabilities”, University of Saskatchewan 
Policies, online: http://www.usask.ca/university_secretary/policies/student/6_02.php.  
236 “Policy for Students with Disabilities”, Policies and Guidelines, University of Alberta, online: 
http://www.ssds.ualberta.ca/en/PoliciesandGuidelines/PolicyforStudentswithDisabilit.aspx.  
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and to the religion and conscience concerns addressed by this thesis.  As our population 
in Canada becomes more diverse, greater numbers of individuals with perspectives that 
differ significantly from the previous mainstream “Canadian culture” may enter medical 
school training in Canada.  These individuals may challenge our established views about 
how to educate medical students, what type of medical care should be available, and how 
to practice medicine in this country.  We need to prepare for these potential challenges by 
establishing a method of dealing with requests, and by reassessing our training systems in 
order to identify what components of medical education should really be considered 
mandatory.  The University of Manitoba College of Medicine has a policy on 
Conscience-Based Exemptions that outlines some requirements that must be fulfilled in 
order for accommodation of any requests for a change to the medical school curriculum 
for the individual (see Appendix).  The existence of this form presupposes that there may 
be instances that arise where students do not want to participate in aspects of standard 
medical school training.   
3.9    Designing a Conscientious Objection Request Form 
The existence of a conscientious objection request policy within a college of 
medicine would facilitate decision-making when teachers and administrators are faced 
with these complex and emotional issues.  I would suggest that the following questions 
be taken into consideration when designing such a policy: 
 What is the request?  
 What is the reason for the request? 
 Does the request weaken the educational process and raise accreditation 
concerns? 
 Can the educational component be acquired in any other manner? 
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 Does the request undermine an educational requirement or BFOR? 
 Does the request require undue hardship on the part of the system for 
accommodation to occur? 
 Will accommodation of the request put patients at risk 
(emotionally/psychologically or physically)? 
• Now (i.e. while the individual is a medical student) 
• Future (i.e. while the individual is a resident or fully-qualified physician) 
 
As identified in the Conscience-Based Exemption Policy from the University of 
Manitoba, it would be helpful to reiterate to any student who is requesting an exemption 
that patient care cannot be compromised by allowing the exemption to be enacted.  This 
perspective is consistent with the CMA Code of Ethics and differs from the situation in 
the United States where many states have introduced legislation to protect physicians 
from litigation when they act in a manner to assuage their conscience, even if their 
behaviour results in harm to patients.  Collection of information for analysis and 
assessment of student requests for accommodation will allow teachers and administrators 
to identify what requests might be amenable to accommodation.  It will also allow 
decision-makers to determine when refusal to accommodate has the potential to fail a 
human rights or Charter challenge.   
 
3.10 Conclusion Chapter 3 
 
Medical students have a number of options available to them, if they want to 
challenge decisions not to accommodate their requests for exemption from certain areas 
of medical training due to conscience or religion-based concerns.  Accommodation of 
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these requests may often be the best approach to take from both a legal and an ethical 
perspective.  Refusal to accommodate may lead to human rights and Charter challenges 
from aggrieved students.  As can be seen from the previous examples, legal challenges 
have a significant likelihood of resulting in a determination that some degree of 
accommodation should be attempted, and that the individual’s rights should be impaired 
as minimally as possible in an attempt to acquire the objective of ensuring that all 
medical students are educated to the level necessary to engage in medical practice in our 
Canadian health care system. 
In light of this, all parties could benefit from the establishment and publication of a 
process for assessing these requests that is transparent and widely available to all 
concerned.  Accommodation requests could then be dealt with in a step-wise, open 
fashion that is reproducible and observable, so that the stress and controversy that often 
surrounds these types of difficult decisions can be reduced.    
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CONCLUSION 
 Conscientious objection by medical students, with respect to involvement in 
certain aspects of medical school education, is likely to increase in frequency over the 
next ten to twenty years.  The reason for this increase is multi-factorial and relates to:  the 
changing philosophy about patient care and the doctor-patient relationship; ideas about 
the unassailable rights of the individual (which apparently includes physician rights); and, 
a fairly recent change in the cultural and religious backgrounds of students who are 
accepted into medical school in Canada and other westernized nations. 
 Some of these conscientious objections and requests for differential treatment will 
challenge our ideas about what should be mandatory in medical school education, and 
cause us to question whether or not there is, or should be, a generic physician produced at 
the completion of medical school training.  Medical education in Canada is accredited by 
the Committee on Accreditation of Canadian Medical Schools (CACMS).  In order for 
this accreditation to be bestowed, certain mandatory aspects of medical training must be 
completed by students registered in these programs.  Assuming that these accreditation 
requirements do not change (and I have assumed this for the purpose of this thesis), 
accommodation of requests for curriculum modification must take these accreditation 
requirements into consideration.  Types and amounts of training that are necessary for 
accreditation therefore become bona fide occupational requirements (BFOR) and 
inability to accommodate students without losing accreditation would appear to meet the 
“undue hardship” test. 
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 Students, who do not have their accommodation requests acceded to by the 
medical school they are enrolled in, might choose to challenge these decisions by 
launching a human rights challenge, or a court challenge by claiming that their rights, as 
defined by the Canadian Charter or Rights and Freedoms, have been violated.  The 
Charter sections most applicable to this type of challenge would be section 2(a), section 
15 and, possibly, section 7.  Section 2(a) has been explored fairly extensively through 
litigation and in the legal academic literature with respect to freedom of religion and the 
boundaries of this Charter right.  Freedom of conscience, although a theoretical legal 
twin of freedom of religion within the description of section 2(a) of the Charter, has not 
been specifically dealt with to any extent by Canadian courts. 
 The requirement for a student (and College of Medicine) to embark upon a human 
rights or legal challenge to settle an accommodation dispute is not ideal.  It would be 
preferable that Colleges of Medicine across Canada have an understanding of the right to 
accommodation engendered by human rights and Charter legislation, and that fair and 
transparent procedures be drawn up for management of these situations in advance of any 
requests that might occur.   Human rights legislation tends to support the individual’s 
right to accommodation to the point of undue hardship, and the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms seeks to find a solution to individual and societal needs that, as 
much as possible, minimally impairs the individual’s rights to manifest belief, despite a 
frequent finding of Charter violation at the initial stage of the evaluation. 
In conclusion, I argue that it is important for medical schools to establish policies 
with respect to accommodation of religious and cultural differences, such that students 
applying to these medical schools will have reasonable expectations about the degree of 
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accommodation that is acceptable and possible.  In Canada, I would suggest that a policy 
should begin by stating that the knowledge and clinical abilities that a student will be 
expected to master, within a Canadian medical school curriculum, will be consistent with 
the expectation of non-discrimination, as identified by provincial and national human 
rights legislation, and with the rights and freedoms as guaranteed by the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  Accommodation is an important component of human 
rights legislation and students can expect reasonable accommodation up to the point of 
“undue hardship.”  Undue hardship will be defined by such things as accreditation 
requirements, fundamental educational objectives (creation of the “generic” physician), 
financial and physical realities of the particular medical school, and the specific effects 
that accommodation might have on the ability of other students to have fair and equitable 
access to training opportunities.  Rights guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms are not without limit and may be curtailed, through section 1 of the 
Charter, if they infringe too significantly on other, equally important, individual rights 
and/or societal objectives. 
 As with most educational and employment situations, “chance favours the 
prepared”237 and whether it be attributed to luck or to good planning, successful 
integration of Canadians of different cultural and religious backgrounds into our 
education and employment sectors will proceed most smoothly through advance 
preparation. 
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1. PURPOSE  
 
 1.1 To accommodate the Conscience-Based Objections of Learners in the Faculty of 
Medicine; 
 
 1.2 
 
 
 
1.3 
To ensure the health and safety of patients through timely and acceptable medical 
care notwithstanding any Conscience-Based Objections or Conscience-Based 
Exemptions; 
 
To ensure Learners meet the objectives of their medical education program; 
 
 1.4 To set out a process for approval and administration of Conscience-Based 
Exemptions. 
 
 
2. DEFINITIONS 
 
 2.1 Learners: means registrants in the University of Manitoba’s Faculty of Medicine 
undergraduate, postgraduate, and physician assistant programs. 
 
 2.2 Conscience-Based Objection: An objection, by a Learner, to participate in certain 
health care activities related to their medical education program, based on ethical, 
religious or personal beliefs. 
 
 2.3 Conscience-Based Exemption:  An approved exemption, for a Learner, from 
participation in certain health care activities. 
 
3. POLICY STATEMENTS 
 
 3.1 A Conscience-Based Objection shall be accommodated by granting a Conscience-
Based Exemption, subject to the provisions of this Policy. 
   
 
 3.2 A Conscience-Based Exemption will not be granted if the Conscience-Based 
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 2. 
 
Objection is based on a prohibited ground of discrimination under the University of 
Manitoba Respectful Work and Learning Environment Policy, the Human Rights 
Code (Manitoba) or the Code of Conduct of the College of Physicians and Surgeons 
of Manitoba.  
 3.3 Any Conscience-Based Objection(s) cannot be so broad that the Conscience-Based 
Exemption(s), if granted, would limit a Learner’s core goals, objectives and 
competencies such that, on completion of the program, the Learner is unable to 
provide recognized standards of care.  If such is the case, the Learner may be 
required to withdraw from the program. 
 
 3.4 A Conscience-Based Exemption does not relieve a Learner from the following 
obligations: 
(a) Effective communication about any services, treatments or procedures the 
Learner chooses not to provide because of his or her ethical, religious or 
personal beliefs 
(b) The provision of information about the existence of any services, treatments 
or procedures, even if such matters conflict with his or her ethical, religious or 
personal beliefs; 
(c) The provision of information without promoting his or her own ethical, 
religious or personal beliefs when interacting with patients; 
(d) When ethical, religious or personal beliefs prevent a Learner from providing 
information about services, treatments or procedures, that Learner must 
inform his or her clinical preceptor such that the patient who seeks such 
advice or medical care is offered timely access to all available options related 
to such matters.   
 
 3.5. A Conscience-Based Exemption does not relieve a Learner from his or her 
professional responsibilities, including: 
(a) To meet the current standard of timely and acceptable medical care; 
(b) To respond expediently to medically emergent situations, including public 
health emergencies, within the boundaries of his or her clinical competence 
and authority, unless or until another practitioner with equal or greater skills 
assumes responsibility for the care of the patient(s); 
(c) To engage in professional behaviour. 
 
 3.6 When a Conscience-Based Exemption prevents a Learner from participation in 
regular curricular learning activities, the Faculty of Medicine will make reasonable 
efforts to provide alternative learning opportunities to enable core learning objectives 
to be met.  All curricular and clinical time missed shall be spent in alternative 
activities under the direction of an appropriate Faculty supervisor. 
 
 3.7 Notwithstanding a Conscience-Based Exemption, a Learner is responsible to learn 
and, through standard evaluative practices, demonstrate knowledge of indications, 
contraindications, benefits and risk pertaining to that procedure or service.  
 
Conscience-Based Exemptions Policy, Faculty of Medicine 
 3. 
 
 
 3.8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Faculty of Medicine shall establish a committee (“Committee”) from its 
membership to receive and review requests from Learners for consideration of a 
Conscience-Based Exemption. 
 
(a)  The Committee shall consist of, at a minimum,  
(i) a Clinician; 
(ii) an Individual with training in medical ethics; and 
(iii) a Learner. 
 
(b) The Committee shall have the authority to grant or deny a Conscience-Based 
Exemption based on the Conscience-Based Objection. 
 
(c) The Committee shall advise the respective Associate Dean regarding the 
granting of a Conscience-Based Exemption to one of their program’s 
Learners.   
 3.9 
 
 
3.10 
If a Conscience-Based Exemption is denied, a Learner may appeal to the Faculty 
Appeals Committee. 
 
No Learner shall be subject to intimidation, harassment or discrimination based on 
the granting of a Conscience-Based Exemption. 
   
 3.11 The Faculty of Medicine shall inform the Winnipeg Regional Health Authority if a 
postgraduate Learner has been granted a Conscience-Based Exemption. 
   
4. REFERENCES 
 
 4.1 The University of Manitoba Respectful Work and Learning Environment Policy 
(http://www.umanitoba.ca/governance/governing_documents/community/230.html)  
   
 4.2 The Human Rights Code (Manitoba) 
(http://web2.gov.mb.ca/laws/statutes/ccsm/h175e.php)  
 
 4.3 College of Physicians and Surgeons of Manitoba, Code of Conduct, December 1, 
2008. (http://cpsm.mb.ca/about-the-college/by-laws-code-of-conduct-statements-
and-guidelines/code-of-conduct) 
 
 
 
4.4 College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario Policy Statement #5-08 – Physicians 
and the Ontario Human Rights Code 
(http://www.cpso.on.ca/uploadedFiles/downloads/cpsodocuments/policies/policies/hu
man_rights.pdf)  
 
 
5. POLICY CONTACT 
 
 Please contact the Associate Dean, Professionalism and Diversity or the Associate 
Dean Students, with questions respecting this policy. 
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 CMA POLICY 
 
CMA Code of Ethics 
(Update 2004) 
 
Last reviewed March 2014: Still relevant 
 
This Code has been prepared by the Canadian Medical Association as an ethical guide for Canadian 
physicians, including residents, and medical students.  Its focus is the core activities of medicine – such as 
health promotion, advocacy, disease prevention, diagnosis, treatment, rehabilitation, palliation, education and 
research. It is based on the fundamental principles and values of medical ethics, especially compassion, 
beneficence, non-maleficence, respect for persons, justice and accountability. The Code, together with CMA 
policies on specific topics, constitutes a compilation of guidelines that can provide a common ethical 
framework for Canadian physicians. 
  
Physicians should be aware of the legal and regulatory requirements that govern medical practice in their 
jurisdictions.  
 
Physicians may experience tension between different ethical principles, between ethical and legal or regulatory 
requirements, or between their own ethical convictions and the demands of other parties.  Training in ethical 
analysis and decision-making during undergraduate, postgraduate and continuing medical education is 
recommended for physicians to develop their knowledge, skills and attitudes needed to deal with these 
conflicts. Consultation with colleagues, regulatory authorities, ethicists, ethics committees or others who have 
relevant expertise is also recommended. 
 
 
Fundamental Responsibilities 
 
1. Consider first the well-being of the patient. 
 
2. Practise the profession of medicine in a manner 
that treats the patient with dignity and as a person 
worthy of respect. 
 
3. Provide for appropriate care for your patient, 
even when cure is no longer possible, including 
physical comfort and spiritual and psychosocial 
support. 
 
4. Consider the well-being of society in matters 
affecting health. 
 
5. Practise the art and science of medicine 
competently, with integrity and without 
impairment. 
 
6. Engage in lifelong learning to maintain and 
improve your professional knowledge, skills and 
attitudes. 
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7. Resist any influence or interference that could 
undermine your professional integrity. 
 
8. Contribute to the development of the medical 
profession, whether through clinical practice, 
research, teaching, administration or advocating on 
behalf of the profession or the public. 
 
9. Refuse to participate in or support practices that 
violate basic human rights. 
 
10. Promote and maintain your own health and 
well-being. 
Responsibilities to the Patient  
General Responsibilities  
 
11. Recognize and disclose conflicts of interest 
that arise in the course of your professional duties 
and activities, and resolve them in the best interest 
of patients. 
 
12. Inform your patient when your personal values 
would influence the recommendation or practice of 
any medical procedure that the patient needs or 
wants.  
 
13. Do not exploit patients for personal advantage.  
 
14. Take all reasonable steps to prevent harm to 
patients; should harm occur, disclose it to the 
patient. 
 
15. Recognize your limitations and, when 
indicated, recommend or seek additional opinions 
and services. 
 
16. In determining professional fees to patients for 
non-insured services, consider both the nature of 
the service provided and the ability of the patient 
to pay, and be prepared to discuss the fee with the 
patient.  
  
Initiating and Dissolving a Patient-Physician 
Relationship 
 
17. In providing medical service, do not 
discriminate against any patient on such grounds 
as age, gender, marital status, medical condition, 
national or ethnic origin, physical or mental 
disability, political affiliation, race, religion, sexual 
orientation, or socioeconomic status. This does not 
abrogate the physician’s right to refuse to accept a 
patient for legitimate reasons. 
 
18. Provide whatever appropriate assistance you 
can to any person with an urgent need for medical 
care. 
 
19. Having accepted professional responsibility for 
a patient, continue to provide services until they 
are no longer required or wanted; until another 
suitable physician has assumed responsibility for 
the patient; or until the patient has been given 
reasonable notice that you intend to terminate the 
relationship. 
 
20. Limit treatment of yourself or members of your 
immediate family to minor or emergency services 
and only when another physician is not readily 
available; there should be no fee for such 
treatment. 
Communication, Decision Making and Consent  
 
21. Provide your patients with the information they 
need to make informed decisions about their 
medical care, and answer their questions to the 
best of your ability.  
 
22. Make every reasonable effort to communicate 
with your patients in such a way that information 
exchanged is understood.  
 
23. Recommend only those diagnostic and 
therapeutic services that you consider to be 
beneficial to your patient or to others. If a service 
is recommended for the benefit of others, as for 
example in matters of public health, inform your 
patient of this fact and proceed only with explicit 
informed consent or where required by law.  
 
24. Respect the right of a competent patient to 
accept or reject any medical care recommended.  
 
25. Recognize the need to balance the developing 
competency of minors and the role of families in 
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medical decision-making.  Respect the autonomy 
of those minors who are authorized to consent to 
treatment. 
 
26. Respect your patient's reasonable request for a 
second opinion from a physician of the patient's 
choice.  
 
27. Ascertain wherever possible and recognize 
your patient's wishes about the initiation, 
continuation or cessation of life-sustaining 
treatment.  
 
28. Respect the intentions of an incompetent 
patient as they were expressed (e.g., through a 
valid advance directive or proxy designation) 
before the patient became incompetent.  
 
29. When the intentions of an incompetent patient 
are unknown and when no formal mechanism for 
making treatment decisions is in place, render such 
treatment as you believe to be in accordance with 
the patient's values or, if these are unknown, the 
patient's best interests.  
 
30. Be considerate of the patient's family and 
significant others and cooperate with them in the 
patient's interest.  
Privacy and Confidentiality  
 
31. Protect the personal health information of your 
patients. 
 
32. Provide information reasonable in the 
circumstances to patients about the reasons for the 
collection, use and disclosure of their personal 
health information. 
 
33. Be aware of your patient’s rights with respect 
to the collection, use, disclosure and access to their 
personal health information; ensure that such 
information is recorded accurately. 
 
34. Avoid public discussions or comments about 
patients that could reasonably be seen as revealing 
confidential or identifying information. 
 
35. Disclose your patients' personal health 
information to third parties only with their consent, 
or as provided for by law, such as when the 
maintenance of confidentiality would result in a 
significant risk of substantial harm to others or, in 
the case of incompetent patients, to the patients 
themselves. In such cases take all reasonable steps 
to inform the patients that the usual requirements 
for confidentiality will be breached. 
 
36. When acting on behalf of a third party, take 
reasonable steps to ensure that the patient 
understands the nature and extent of your 
responsibility to the third party. 
 
37. Upon a patient’s request, provide the patient or 
a third party with a copy of his or her medical 
record, unless there is a compelling reason to 
believe that information contained in the record 
will result in substantial harm to the patient or 
others. 
Research  
 
38.  Ensure that any research in which you 
participate is evaluated both scientifically and 
ethically and is approved by a research ethics 
board that meets current standards of practice.  
  
39.  Inform the potential research subject, or 
proxy, about the purpose of the study, its source of 
funding, the nature and relative probability of 
harms and benefits, and the nature of your 
participation including any compensation.  
 
40.  Before proceeding with the study, obtain the 
informed consent of the subject, or proxy, and 
advise prospective subjects that they have the right 
to decline or withdraw from the study at any time, 
without prejudice to their ongoing care.  
Responsibilities to Society  
 
41.  Recognize that community, society and the 
environment are important factors in the health of 
individual patients.  
 
42.  Recognize the profession's responsibility to 
society in matters relating to public health, health 
education, environmental protection, legislation 
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affecting the health or well-being of the 
community and the need for testimony at judicial 
proceedings. 
 
43.  Recognize the responsibility of physicians to 
promote equitable access to health care resources.  
 
44.  Use health care resources prudently.  
 
45.  Recognize a responsibility to give generally 
held opinions of the profession when interpreting 
scientific knowledge to the public; when 
presenting an opinion that is contrary to the 
generally held opinion of the profession, so 
indicate.  
Responsibilities to the Profession  
 
46.  Recognize that the self-regulation of the 
profession is a privilege and that each physician 
has a continuing responsibility to merit this 
privilege and to support its institutions. 
 
47.  Be willing to teach and learn from medical 
students, residents, other colleagues and other 
health professionals. 
 
48.  Avoid impugning the reputation of colleagues 
for personal motives; however, report to the 
appropriate authority any unprofessional conduct 
by colleagues.  
 
49. Be willing to participate in peer review of 
other physicians and to undergo review by your 
peers. Enter into associations, contracts and 
agreements only if you can maintain your 
professional integrity and safeguard the interests of 
your patients.  
 
50. Avoid promoting, as a member of the medical 
profession, any service (except your own) or 
product for personal gain. 
 
51. Do not keep secret from colleagues the 
diagnostic or therapeutic agents and procedures 
that you employ.  
 
52. Collaborate with other physicians and health 
professionals in the care of patients and the 
functioning and improvement of health services.  
Treat your colleagues with dignity and as persons 
worthy of respect. 
Responsibilities to Oneself  
 
53.  Seek help from colleagues and appropriately 
qualified professionals for personal problems that 
might adversely affect your service to patients, 
society or the profession.  
 
54. Protect and enhance your own health and well-
being by identifying those stress factors in your 
professional and personal lives that can be 
managed by developing and practising appropriate 
coping strategies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
